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to borrowers under rules of the Library. Brief quotations from this thesis are allowable
without special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgment of source is made.
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SUMMARY
This thesis investigates the factors inuencing an academics involvement with
industry and how these collaborations a¤ect research outputs in terms of publications and
patents. It employs a longitudinal dataset that comprises more than 4000 engineering
academics over 20 years and a smaller subsample of 479 academics over 12 years and
uses robust econometric approaches to address issues of unobserved heterogeneity and
endogeneity. Collaboration with industry is measured through two funding modes: (1)
funding received from industry directly and (2) funding from the research council that
involves business partners. The thesis is unique in its ability to measure two distinct
types of funding over a long time period and compare these to commercialisation e¤orts of
academics. It analyses the relationship between both activities and relates it to academics
publication numbers. Considering all three activities jointly allows some new insights into
their complementarities as well as identifying possible substitution e¤ects.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS
1.1 Background
Modern science and technology industries have been built on the expertise of university
research and science has long been an important factor for economic growth in modern,
knowledge based economies. Discoveries at research institutions provided the basis for
many new commercial opportunities leading to the development of new industries (in the
case of biotechnology or microelectronics) or transforming existing ones. However, since
the publication of some blockbuster patents that earned inventors and their universities
hundreds of millions of dollars, the commercial prospects of university research have come
to be a major focus of government policy. Academic research is no longer undertaken for
the sake of creating knowledge alone but increasingly driven by the needs of industry and
its market value.
Driven by economic changes in the 1970s which saw industries under-investing in re-
search and university budgets shrinking (Geuna, 2001), over the past three decades policy
makers have emphasised that links between the science base and industry would improve
economic growth and competitiveness. Encouraging such links and the successful commer-
cialisation of university inventions have since become major policy goals in the US and in
Europe. Governments across the world are providing incentives for researchers to engage
in research partnerships with industry, to undertake projects with greater commercial
prospects, and to patent scientic research.
Policy makers hope that such links could provide commercially exploitable academic
knowledge for industry, and new sources of funding for university research (Gibbons and
Johnston, 1974; Poyago-Theotoky et al., 2002). In the UK, for instance, since the 1980s
government reports have emphasised the importance of university-industry partnerships
and research driven by societal needs and technology foresight (Tapper, 2007). Fi-
nancial incentives were given to encourage such initiatives and legislation in the vein of the
Bayh-Dole Act introduced to enable universities to develop commercial activities. Also,
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the number of directed research grants increased dramatically, all with the implicit aim
to steer research in the governments policy direction (Tapper, 2007), albeit with mixed
success (Cervantes, 1998).
Policy initiatives were largely initiated based on anecdotal evidence of commercial
success in the US, despite ambiguous empirical evidence. Several papers reported that
governments held unrealistic expectations regarding income generated from licensed in-
ventions and contract research (Feller, 1990; Nelson, 2001, 2006) and that it is unclear
whether the Bayh-Dole Act made a real di¤erence (Mowery et al., 2001). Yet, universi-
ties across Europe are transforming and making wealth creation and societal impact their
third mission.
In this introductory chapter I give a brief overview over di¤erent arguments regarding
the benets and risks of university-industry collaboration for the individual scientists and
introduce some existing empirical evidence. I point out the drawbacks of empirical analysis
and give suggestions for solving these problems (section 2). Having set the backdrop of
this thesis I specify the purpose of my work, give a brief overview over the three papers
and present the contributions of this PhD work (section 3). Section 4 nally summarises
the implications for the policy agenda. The most important conclusion is that there still
is more need for empirical analysis and appropriate data.
1.2 Empirical Analysis of University-Industry Collabora-
tion
1.2.1 Benets and Concerns for Academic Researchers
While many government policies to encourage science-industry links and commerciali-
sation seem sound at the macroeconomic level, they assume that the research agendas
of academics can be inuenced by monetary incentives. There is evidence, however, to
indicate that academic scientists, unlike researchers in industry, value independence in
choosing their research agenda more highly than monetary rewards (Levin and Stephan,
1991). The question then arises, how does industry collaboration and patenting relate to
the traditional publication based reward structure and the researchers intrinsic motiva-
tion to publish? The two main challenges for empirical research, thus, are (1) to identify
those factors that steer academics towards commercialisation and collaboration, and (2)
to identify potential negative consequences for academic research.
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In many subject areas, including engineering and material science, industry links are
inevitable and indeed much of the research would not be possible without the input of
industry partners. In a survey of 671 academic scientists and engineers, Lee (2000) reports
securing of funds for equipment and research assistants as the principal reason for collab-
oration with industry, leading to more autonomy and exibility for academic researchers.
Additionally, contacts to industry allow insight into applied research processes providing
new ideas for research.
However, concerns over patenting and an increased involvement with industry, espe-
cially with regard to limitations imposed on knowledge dissemination and choice of research
topics, at the expense of open science and fundamental research, have been addressed
by several scholars (Bok, 1982; Dasgupta and David, 1994; Feller, 1990; Florida and Co-
hen, 1999; Nelson, 2001, 2004; Poyago-Theotoky et al., 2002). It is feared that applied
sponsors and commercial objectives may inuence the performance of academics, diverting
their attention away from scientic research, as well as shifting their choice of research
topic towards an applied approach. Initial survey results by Blumenthal et al. (1986)
conrmed these concerns, with researchers reporting that industry collaboration has a
negative impact on their research productivity and that it skews their research towards
applied topics.
These concerns have been picked up by empirical analysis with a large number of papers
investigating a potential trade-o¤ between patenting and academic research output (for
a recent review see Baldini (2008) and Foray and Lissoni (2010)). Most of these studies,
however, nd a positive link between patenting and publications (e.g. Azoulay et al., 2009;
Bercovitz and Feldman, 2008; Calderini et al. 2007; Stephan et al., 2007; Zucker et al.,
1998). Empirical work has also failed to nd any evidence for a shift towards applied
research (e.g. Thursby and Thursby, 2007).
While the link between patenting and publications is well researched, there is little
empirical work on how they are linked to other forms of knowledge transfer. Indeed,
the lack of such studies is considerable given the potential negative e¤ect of industry
collaboration on academia and the fact that it is far wider spread amongst academics than
patenting (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002; Geuna and Nesta, 2006). While some papers
argue that so called star researchers are most attractive to industry (Zucker et al., 1998),
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Goldfarb (2008) nds that mid-level researchers attract the majority of applied funding.
A recent study by Thursby and Thursby (2010) nds a positive link between publications,
patents and industry funding suggesting that all three activities are complementary.
Most of the existing evidence is based on cross-sectional data or case studies and
does not consider the dynamics of the research process, making it di¢cult to draw strong
conclusions for future research. The focus has largely been on the coexistence of di¤erent
academic and commercial activities without tracing the e¤ect of increases in collaboration
and changes in policy directives. There is, hence, a further requirement for longitudinal
studies on the e¤ects and determinants of industry collaboration. The next section will
discuss in more detail some of the pitfalls in the empirical analysis of the relationship
between industry involvement and scientic work.
1.2.2 Drawbacks of Empirical Analysis
Though a large body of literature has approached the topic of industry involvement and its
e¤ect on individual academics, empirical analysis has been faced with a range of method-
ological problems, not all of which it has been able to solve.
Firstly, measurement problems are encountered in empirical analysis. The scientic
research process is characterised by a multitude of research inputs and outputs, and most
studies have only been able to collect a small proportion of these. It has been acceptable
practice for empirical studies to use bibliometric measures of research activity, publication
and patent numbers, in the analysis of university-industry collaboration, due to their
accessibility. However, researchers also supply teaching, contract research and consulting,
and apply for research grants, all of which are information which very few studies have been
able to consider. Collection of such data has been limited to surveys and cross-sectional
analysis, which are limited in size and unable to address changes in scientic research.
Therefore, the development of indicators, other than patent and publication metrics, for
possible channels of industry involvement should remain the foremost aim of economic
analysis in this eld. As Geuna and Nesta (2006: 805) stated: there is an urgent need
for more reliable and more useful data (on a time series basis) to be collected, not only
on IP activity, but also on the inputs and outputs of the other activities carried out by
researchers and research organisations.
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In addition to measurement problems, we encounter problems in determining the di-
rection of causality. Any factor can be considered both as an input and an output of
scientic research. For example, the current levels of funds are determined by past lev-
els of publications, and are likely to inuence future levels of publications. This causes
problems of reverse causality and potential endogeneity (Bonaccorsi and Daraio, 2003).
A potential endogeneity problem further arises, as both funding and publications may
be inuenced by unobserved factors, such as a researchers ability. It is imperative that
economic analysis takes these e¤ects into account if it is to achieve robust results, and a
majority of existing studies has failed to do so. In order to solve endogeneity it is im-
portant to nd instrumental variables, to control for previous states of research activity,
and to exploit the e¤ect of exogenous and over-time variation in academic research. It
is therefore most desirable to collect longitudinal data on academic activity to be able to
solve the di¤erent causes of endogeneity.1
A third problem relates to the dynamic nature of the research process. The distribution
of publications, patents, and industry grants amongst researchers is highly skewed and
current levels of activity are intrinsically linked to past levels (e.g. Blundell et al., 1995).
So far, very few studies have considered dynamic feedback to academic research in their
analysis of university-industry collaboration. Additionally, we encounter unknown and
variable time-lags between inputs and outputs of research and di¤ering short and long
term e¤ects (Bonaccorsi and Daraio, 2003). It is therefore important to consider long
time-series to be able to consider varying time-lags, and to explore the systematic changes
in university-industry collaboration.2
Though a large number of empirical studies have tried to analyse the relationship
between industry-collaboration and academic research, most have failed to consider all
three problems of econometric analysis addressed above.
Additional to these methodological problems a further issue derives from the explicit
1Attempts to solve the endogeneity in the scientic research process have been made by Fabrizio and
DiMinin (2008) using lags of university patents as instruments, Goldfarb et al. (2009) using lagged venture
capital and patents by peers as instruments, and by Breschi et al. (2008), Franzoni et al. (2009) and
Azoulay et al. (2009) using inverse probability of treatment weights to predict selection into patenting.
The validity of these approaches, however, has been questioned (Foray and Lissoni, 2010).
2Agrawal and Henderson (2002) is one of the very few papers considering dynamic feedback and varying
time-lags in its analysis and nds the lagged dependent variable to have a stronger impact than other
factors.
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focus on developments in the US. As Europe has a very di¤erent university, funding,
reward and patenting structure, it is di¢cult to directly transpose results from the US
to the European environment. It is therefore essential to perform more robust analysis
on European data with large longitudinal datasets, both using existing indicators and
producing new ones.
1.3 Contribution of This Thesis
1.3.1 Purpose
In light of the issues addressed above, this PhD thesis is particularly interested in the
analysis of individual academics in the UK collaborating with industry. It aims to identify
those factors steering researchers towards collaboration and patenting, and to analyse the
importance of industry involvement for scientic research.
The discussion thus far has indicated that there is more need for data and studies on
industry collaboration to contribute to the current debate on the role of the university.
This thesis has the ambition to address these issues by investigating the collaboration and
patenting behaviour of engineering academics in the UK. As one of the rst countries in
Europe to adopt policies supporting academic involvement in knowledge transfer, the UK
presents an interesting case to study. It is also of interest in view of future developments
for the rest of Europe (see appendix A for a detailed description of policy developments
in the UK).
The thesis rstly contributes by presenting new longitudinal data that takes into ac-
count existing and new indicators for industry collaboration. It uses funding data to mea-
sure involvement with industry, and shows that this activity is indeed far more widespread
than patenting. This thesis follows other studies on patenting in Europe by considering all
patents with a university inventor, and conrms that for the UK the majority of academic
patents are owned by industry (see Appendix B for a detailed description of the data and
the data collection process as well as its limitations).
Using this data this thesis tries to identify and characterise those researchers that are
likely to engage in collaborative and commercial projects. It further examines some of
the recent concerns by analysing the impact of collaboration and commercialisation on
academic research output, and the circumstances under which individual researchers can
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benet from these. Specically it tries to answer the following three questions:
(1) What developments have there been in industry funding and collaborative and
commercial research in the UK?
(2) What a¤ects a researchers engagement in di¤erent forms of industry collabo-
ration and commercialisation?
(3) What are the e¤ects of collaboration and commercialisation activities on sci-
entic productivity?
In order to answer these questions I pursue a robust, empirical analysis of the data.
Using time-series I am able to consider the dynamic nature of the research process and try
to address potential endogeneity issues. The database provides a method of controlling for
reverse causality and enabling me to separate e¤ects and determinants of university-rm
alliances.
1.3.2 Outline
This thesis consists of three papers. The rst paper examines the e¤ects of industry
collaboration on academic research output. Specically, we study the impact of university-
industry research collaborations via research council sponsored funding partnerships, on
academic output, in terms of productivity and direction of research. We use panel data
techniques to control for heterogeneity and consider dynamic feedback by including lags
of the dependent variable, and endogeneity by using lags of the regressors as instruments.
Using the di¤erence generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator we compare the
e¤ects of instrumenting for some of the explanatory variables on the results. The main
ndings suggest that researchers collaborating with industry publish more than their peers.
However, this positive e¤ect decreases for higher levels of industry involvement, once we
control for the endogeneity of research funding. Moreover, is this the rst evidence to rmly
establish the presence of a skewing e¤ect, suggesting that growing ties with industry
"skew" research towards a more applied approach. Considering funding partnerships also
diminishes the e¤ect of patenting on publication numbers, indicating that it is far more
important for predicting research outputs than other forms of knowledge transfer.
The second paper tries to identify the factors that explain researchers involvement with
industry through two di¤erent channels of collaboration, (1) direct funding from industry
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and (2) research council sponsored collaboration. Specically, it studies how publication
and patenting histories enable access to di¤erent types of collaborative funding. Using
the system GMM estimator it considers the dynamic feedback of past collaboration and
endogeneity. I use lags of endogenous variables and several exogenous factors, e.g. lags of
department publications and patents as well as lagged di¤erences of department wealth and
regional business enterprise R&D, as instruments. As di¤erent types of funding may act as
complements I additionally estimate a system of simultaneous equations using 3SLS. The
results show that collaboration through research council sponsored programmes is closely
related to scientic activity in terms of publication numbers. I further nd that patents can
help leverage direct industry sponsorship. This evidence is supportive of hypotheses that
direct collaboration requires a di¤erent set of skills and that science oriented academics
engage in symbolic partnerships via the research councils.
The third paper investigates the increasing commercialisation of academic research
by looking at the e¤ect of industry funding and publications on a researchers patenting
activities. The paper employs a di¤erent approach to panel data estimation that uses
pre-sample information of the dependent variable to control for heterogeneity (Blundell et
al., 1995). It further attempts to account for the large number of zeroes in the data by
modeling their source using zero inated regression techniques. The ndings indicate that
funding from industry has a strong e¤ect on the number of patents generated and that
industry partners can spur academics towards commercialisation. Publication numbers
can be helpful in explaining an academics overall research activity and hence propensity
to produce potentially patentable research. However, not all publishable research is also
patentable and I show that only high impact research can increase the number of patents.
1.3.3 Contributions
The main contributions of this thesis are represented in a few key points.
1. It provides new longitudinal data and presents new indicators for university-industry
collaboration.
2. It provides evidence for the importance of using robust empirical methods that
specically take into account the potential endogeneity problem and unobserved
heterogeneity.
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3. It nds that industry collaboration through funding partnerships is an important
factor for determining the number of publications and patents. Funding, in both
cases, is found to be most inuential and the often reported link between publications
and patents is less strong than indicated by previous papers.
4. It also shows that publications and patents di¤erently a¤ect the access to vari-
ous types of university-industry collaboration. Patents have a positive impact on
the receipt of direct funding from industry, while publications positively a¤ect the
propensity to engage in EPSRC sponsored collaborations. This points out the im-
portance of considering di¤erent types of collaborations, and makes restrictions on
the applicability of some of my results on other forms of knowledge transfer.
1.4 Concluding Remarks
The ndings of this thesis suggest that encouraging collaboration with industry is a bene-
cial policy but also show that not all types of collaboration are equally benecial. Mod-
erate collaboration mediated by the research councils increases publications, while direct
funding from industry seems to rather increase the number of patents.
Policy makers in the UK have been pushing for more collaboration and commercial
applicability in research. I show that both are linked and that it is benecial to further
encourage commercialisation of research if a new funding regime is desired. However,
the focus on collaborative research may also be contra-productive as it seems to push
researchers towards symbolic partnerships to conform to the new requirements of the UK
funding and research councils.
I also nd some evidence that the continuous support through non-competitive grants
is key for providing academics with good basis for external research funding acquisition.
This policy recommendation contradicts the current e¤orts of the UK funding councils to
reduce non-competitive grant allocation.
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CHAPTER II
THE IMPACT OF INDUSTRY COLLABORATION ON
ACADEMIC RESEARCH: EVIDENCE FROM THE UK
(WITH ALBERT BANAL-ESTANOL AND MIREIA
JOFRE-BONET)
2.1 Introduction
In a modern economy it is essential to transform scientic research into competitive ad-
vantages. In the US, extensive collaboration between universities and industry and the
ensuing transfer of scientic knowledge has been viewed as one of the main contributors
to the successful technological innovation and economic growth of the past three decades
(Hall, 2004). At the same time, the insu¢cient interaction between universities and rms
in the EU is, according to a report of the European Commission (1995) itself, one of the
main factors for the poor commercial and technological performance of the EU in high-tech
sectors.
Nowadays, increasing the transfer of knowledge from universities to industry is a pri-
mary policy aim in most developed economies. In the 1980s, spurred by the so-called
competitiveness crisis, the US introduced a series of structural changes in the intellectual
property regime accompanied by several incentive programs, designed specically to pro-
mote collaboration between universities and industry (Lee, 2000).1 Almost 30 years on,
many elements of the US system of knowledge transfer have been emulated in many other
parts of the world.2
1As documented by Poyago-Theotky et al. (2002) the US passed during the 1980s: (i) the Bayh-Dole act
(1980) that allowed universities to own and license patents emanating from federally funded research; (ii)
the National Cooperative Research Act (1984) that reduced antitrust penalties from engaging in research
joint ventures; (iii) the Omnibus and Trade and Competitiveness Act (1988) that established the Advanced
Technology Program, which supports collaborative research projects in generic technologies. During this
decade, the National Science Foundation also substantially increased the funding for University-Industry
Cooperative Research Centers.
2The UK Government, for example, published in 1993 a White Paper on Science, Engineering and
Technology, which set out a strategy to improve welfare by exploiting the UK strengths in science and
engineering (DfE, 1993).
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The increased incentives (and pressures) to collaborate with industry have controver-
sial side e¤ects on the production of scientic research itself. Nelson (2004) argues that
industry involvement might delay or suppress scientic publication and the dissemination
of preliminary results, endangering the intellectual commons and the practices of open
science (Dasgupta and David, 1994). Florida and Cohen (1999) claim that industry col-
laboration might come at the expense of basic research: growing ties with industry might
be a¤ecting the choice of research projects, skewing academic research from a basic
towards an applied approach.
Faculty contributing to knowledge and technology transfer, on the other hand, main-
tain that industry collaboration complements their own academic research by securing
funds for graduate students and lab equipment, and by providing them with ideas for
their own research (Lee, 2000). Financial rewards might even have a positive impact
on the production of basic research because basic and applied research e¤orts might be
complementary (Thursby et al., 2007) or because they might induce a selection of riskier
research programmes (Banal-Estanol and Macho-Stadler, 2010).3
These claims bring forward two questions for empirical research: (1) Does collaboration
with industry a¤ect researchers productivity in terms of publication rates? (2) Does
collaboration with industry shift the focus away from basic research? Previous research
has investigated these questions using patents and licensing and the formation of start-up
companies as measures of industry collaboration (see Geuna and Nesta, 2006, and Baldini,
2008, for recent reviews). Many papers, however, have stressed the relatively small role of
the commercialisation of intellectual property rights relative to other channels of knowledge
transfer. Collaborative links through joint research, consulting or training arrangements
are far more important transmission channels for the industry than patents, licenses and
spin-o¤s (Cohen et al. 2002). Academics believe that patents account for less than 10%
of the knowledge transferred from their labs (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002). Contract
research or joint research agreements are far more widespread (DEste and Patel, 2007),
especially in Europe (Geuna and Nesta, 2006). Possibly due to the lack of comparable
3This debate has now reached society at large. Many public channels, including the BBC (through the
BBC Radio 4 programme In Business, October 13, 2005), The Guardian (August 5, 2005 and January
27, 2007), The Observer (April 4, 2004), have addressed the consequences of increased university-industry
collaborations.
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data, though, we still know very little about the impact of more collaborative forms of
university-industry interactions.
To ll this gap, we compiled a unique, longitudinal dataset containing academic re-
search output (publications), research funds and patents for all the academics that were
employed at all the Engineering Departments of 40 major UK universities between 1985
and 2007. We concentrate on the engineering sector, as it has traditionally been associ-
ated with applied research and industry collaboration and it contributes substantially to
industrial R&D (Cohen et al. 2002). Comparing the e¤ect of grants with and without
industry partners, we can identify the individual impact of industrial collaboration on
academic productivity. Following the academics over time we are also able to control for
individual characteristics, potential reverse causality problems, and the dynamic e¤ect of
publications. Moreover, since our dataset contains the majority of academic engineers in
the UK, our results are not driven by the most successful researchers, those at a single
university, or academic inventors alone.
As a rst contribution, we uncover two countervailing e¤ects in the impact of collab-
orative research on academic research output. Researchers with no industry involvement
are predicted to publish less than those with a small degree of collaboration. Nevertheless,
higher levels of industry involvement negatively a¤ect research productivity. Therefore,
the existence of industry partners is positive but the intensity of industry collaboration is
negative. The predicted publication rate of an academic with an average level of collabo-
ration is higher than that of an academic with no collaborative funding. But, for higher
levels of collaboration, the predicted number of publications turns out to be lower, and
can even be lower than for those with no funding at all.
We show that it is key to take into account the inherent endogeneity problems caused
by the dynamic e¤ects and the existence of reverse causality. As shown by previous
papers (e.g. Arora et al., 1998; Agrawal and Henderson, 2002), past, present and future
publications are correlated. If one does not include past publications in the regression,
industry collaboration would capture the positive e¤ects of past productivity and it would
appear to be unambiguously good. But if one includes lags of the dependent variable, there
are endogeneity problems. Further, successful, productive researchers are better placed
to attract interest from industry. Industry collaboration can be the consequence, and not
27
just the cause, of high numbers of publications. We therefore use a dynamic panel data
estimation method in which the lagged dependent variable and other endogenous variables
are instrumented for.
Our results bolster empirical evidence from previous surveys and cross-sectional studies
by establishing a causal relationship between collaborative research and academic output.
Some studies suggest that industry involvement is linked to higher academic productivity
(e.g. Gulbrandsen and Smeby, 2005; Thursby and Thursby, 2010).4 Once controlling for
endogeneity, we still nd supportive evidence for the positive impact of the presence of
collaboration on research output. The negative e¤ect of the intensity of collaboration
is also consistent with survey results (Blumenthal et al., 1986, 1996a) and cross-section
empirical evidence (Manjarres-Henriquez et al., 2008, 2009). We are only aware of one
(two-period) panel study that is able to control for individual characteristics: Goldfarb
(2008) documents a decrease in the academic output from 1981-1987 to 1988-1994 for
the average researcher in a sample of 221 university researchers repeatedly funded by the
NASA.5
The second main contribution of this paper is to show that industry collaboration has a
negative e¤ect on the number of basic research articles while it increases the more applied
type of research publications. These results are consistent with the skewing e¤ect of
industry involvement on direction and focus of research pointed out by questionnaire data
studies. Blumenthal et al. (1986) and Gulbrandsen and Smeby (2005), for example, report
that the choices of research topics of academics whose research is supported by industry
were biased by their commercial potential. Instead, the empirical papers using patenting
and licensing as measures of industry involvement fail to nd evidence of a negative e¤ect
of patenting on the number of basic publications (Breschi et al., 2008; Calderini et al. 2007;
Hicks and Hamilton, 1999; Thursby and Thursby, 2002, 2007; van Looy et al., 2006).6 We
believe that our ndings are the rst to rmly establish the presence of a skewing e¤ect.
4As argued by Blumenthal et al. (1986), the most obvious explanation for this observed relation [...]
is that companies selectively support talented and energetic faculty who were already highly productive.
5The NASA, despite not being an industrial partner, is a very programmatic, mission-oriented govern-
ment agency.
6Thursby and Thursby (2002), for example, conclude that changes in the direction of faculty research
seem to be relatively less important than other factors in explaining the increased licensing activity.
Thursby and Thursby (2007), as Hicks and Hamilton (1999) earlier, nd no systematic change in the
proportion of publications in basic versus applied journals between 1983 and 1999.
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The third contribution of this study is to compare and separate out the e¤ects of col-
laboration sponsored through research grants with industrial partners from the e¤ects of
patenting. After controlling for the dynamic nature of the publication process and the
endogeneity of partnerships with the industry, we nd that patenting does not hinder or
delay the publication of research results but does not a¤ect it positively either. These
ndings diverge from most recent empirical studies suggesting a positive relationship be-
tween patenting and publication rates (Azoulay et al., 2009; Breschi et al., 2008; Calderini
et al. 2007; Fabrizio and DiMinin, 2008; Stephan et al., 2007; van Looy et al., 2005).7
Our results are most consistent with those of Agrawal and Henderson (2002), who found
that patenting did not a¤ect publishing rates of 236 scientists in two MIT departments
in a 15-year panel, and those of Goldfarb et al. (2009) who report similar results for the
e¤ect of licensing on the number of publications for 57 inventors at Stanford University in
an 11-year panel.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we describe the dataset and introduce
our empirical strategy. Section 3 presents our main results, discussing in detail the problem
of endogeneity. Section 4 discusses and concludes.
2.2 Empirical Strategy
2.2.1 Data
We created a unique longitudinal dataset containing demographic characteristics, publi-
cations, research funds and patents for all researchers employed at the Engineering De-
partments of 40 major UK universities between 1985 and 2007 (see Table 1 for a list of
universities). Starting from all universities with engineering departments in the UK, we
discarded those for which university calendars providing detailed sta¤ information were
available for less than ve years. Our nal sample contains 40 major universities, including
all the 19 universities that are members of the prestigious Russell Group, a coalition of
research intensive UK universities, as well as 21 comprehensive universities and technical
institutions.
7Fabrizio and DiMinin (2008), for instance, found a positive e¤ect of researchers patent stocks on
publication counts in a sample of 166 academic inventors as compared to a matched set of non-patenting
scientists. Azoulay et al. (2009) observe that both the ow and the stock of scientists patents are positively
related to subsequent publication rates without comprising the quality of the published research.
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We retrieved names and academic ranks of university researchers from university cal-
endars.8 We focused on academic sta¤ carrying out both teaching and research and did
not consider research o¢cers or teaching assistants. Whenever possible, we obtained full
names (rst and last name), when not possible, we had to record last names with the two
initials of the rst name. We followed the researchers career paths between the di¤erent
universities in our dataset.9 Academics leave (and join or rejoin) our dataset at di¤erent
stages in their career, when they move to (or from) abroad, industry, departments other
than engineering (e.g. chemistry, physics, computer science), or universities not part of
our dataset. In total we collected 7,707 individuals, 5,172 of which remain in our dataset
for six years or more. They represent the basis for our data collection and enable us to
retrieve information on publications, research funds and patents.
Publications. Data on publications was derived from the ISI Science Citation Index
(SCI). The number of publications in peer-reviewed journals even if not the only measure
is the best recorded and the most accepted measure for research output as publications
are essential in gaining scientic reputation and for career advancements (Dasgupta and
David, 1994). We collected information on all the articles published by researchers in our
database while they were employed at one of the 40 institutions in our sample. Most entries
in the SCI database include detailed address data that allowed us to identify institutional
a¢liations and unequivocally assign articles to individual researchers.10
Research funds. The information on industry collaborations are based on grants given
by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), the main UK gov-
ernment agency for funding research in engineering and the physical sciences. Each award
holds information on research collaborators, and grants with one or more industry partner
are considered collaborative grants. As dened by the EPSRC, Collaborative Research
8University calendars and prospectuses are available through the British Library, which by Act of
Parliament is entitled to receive a free copy of every item published in the United Kingdom. This data
was supplemented with information from the Internet Archive. The Internet Archive is a not-for-prot
organisation maintaining a free Internet library, committed to o¤ering access to digital collections. Their
collection dates back to 1996 and enabled us to retrieve information from outdated Internet sites.
9This was done by matching names and subject areas and checking websites of the researchers.
10Publications without address data had to be ignored. However, we expect this missing information to
be random and to not a¤ect the data systematically.
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Grants are grants led by academic researchers, but involve other partners. Partners gen-
erally contribute either cash or in-kind services to the full economic cost of the research.
The EPSRC encourages research in collaboration with the industry. As a result, around
35% of EPSRC grants presently involve partners from industry. The volume of EPSRC
grants with industry partners cannot be taken as a proxy for direct funding from the
industry. But, since the EPSRC is by far the largest provider of funding for research in
engineering (amounting to around 50% of overall funding), these mediated partnerships
allow for a very comprehensive (and homogeneous) insight into the dynamics of university-
industry collaborations. Our database contains information on start year and duration of
the grant, total amount of funding, names of principal investigators and co-investigators,
institution of the principal investigators (the grant receiving institution), and names of
partner organisations. Data on these grants is available from 1986 onwards.
Patents. Patent data was obtained from the European Patent O¢ce (EPO) database.
We collected those patents that identify the aforementioned researchers as inventors and
were led while they were employed at one of the 40 institutions. We not only consider
patents led by the universities themselves but also those assigned to third parties, e.g.
industry or government agents. The ling date of a patent was recorded as representing
the closest date to invention. Since the ling process can take several years, we were
only able to include patents awarded by 2007, hence led before 2005.11 The EPO covers
only a subsample of patents led with the UK Intellectual Property O¢ce (UKIPO).
Nevertheless, those patents that are taken to the EPO may probably be those with higher
economic potential and/or quality (Maurseth and Verspagen, 2002).
Sample. Limited information on patents and grants reduced our sample period to 1986-
2004. We further excluded all inactive researchers (those with neither publications, patents
or funds during the entire sample period). This left us with a nal sample consisting
of 4,066 individuals, with 44,722 year observations, 75,380 publications, 29,347 research
11Just like previous studies (see e.g. Fabrizio and DiMinin, 2008), data construction requires a manual
search in the inventor database to identify the entries that were truly the same inventor and to exclude
others with similar or identical names. This was done comparing address, title and technology class for
all patents potentially attributable to each inventor. The EPO database is problematic in that many
inventions have multiple entries. It was therefore necessary to compare priority numbers to ensure that
each invention is only included once in our data.
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projects, and 1,828 patents.
2.2.2 Variables and Descriptive Statistics
In this section we dene the variables used to estimate our models. We created measures
of research output, research collaboration, patents, and time variant and time invariant
control variables. Russell Group universities are considered research intensive institutions
and attract most of the UKs research funding, we therefore display all summary statistics
separately for researchers at universities belonging to the Russell Group and for researchers
that are not.
Research output. As a measure of research output, we consider the normal count
of publications (the number of publications for which the researcher is an author) in
accordance with the majority of studies on industry collaboration. However, publication
counts might be misleading for articles with a large number of authors and may not
reect a researchers e¤ective productivity. We therefore additionally obtain the co-
author-weighted count of publications for which we weight a publication associated to an
academic by the inverse of the publications number of coauthors.12
Kelchtermans and Veugelers (2009) nd that (non-collaborative) funding has a di¤erent
impact on research quantity than on research quality. To investigate the question whether
researchers with links to industry publish articles of lower quality we use the impact-
factor-weighted sum of publications (with the weights being the impact attributed to the
publishing journal) as an additional proxy of academic publishing activity. To do so, we
use the SCI Journal Impact Factor (JIF), a measure of importance attribution based on
the number of citations a journal receives to adjust for relative quality. Though not a
direct measure for quality, the JIF represents the importance attributed to a particular
article by peer review. As the JIF of journals di¤ers between years, and journals are
constantly added to the SCI, we collected JIFs for all the years 1985-2007, to capture all
SCI journals and to allow for variation in the impact factor.
Figure 1 shows that the average number of publications per sta¤ was rising continu-
ously over the sample period, in both the Russell Group and the Non-Russell Group of
12Formally, the coauthor weighted count of a researcher i in year t is given by
PPubit
p=1
1
Coaitp
, where
Pubit is his number of publications in that year and Coaitp is the number of coauthors of an article p.
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universities.13 Table 2 shows the all-time averages and the di¤erences between the two
groups of universities and it shows that the average number of publications per member
of sta¤ per year is signicantly higher for the elite Russell Group of universities (1.67 vs.
1.10). The di¤erence in publications between the Russell Group universities and the rest
stays signicant even after we take into account the number of coauthors (0.61 vs. 0.42)
or we adjust for quality (1.77 vs. 0.97).
As an indicator of the direction of research we use the Patent board (formerly CHI)
classication (version 2005), developed by Narin et al. (1976) and updated by Kimberley
Hamilton for the National Science Foundation (NSF). Based on cross-citations matrices
between journals, it characterises the general research orientation of journals, distinguish-
ing between (1) applied technology, (2) engineering and technological science, (3) applied
and targeted basic research, and (4) basic scientic research. Godin (1996) and van Looy
et al. (2006) reinterpreted the categories as (1) applied technology, (2) basic technology,
(3) applied science, and (4) basic science; and grouped the rst two as technology and
the last two as science. Due to the applied character of engineering science, categories
1 and 2 represent 27% and 46% of all publications whereas category 4 only represents 7%
of the articles in our sample.
Collaborative research and patents. Principal investigators and co-investigators on
sponsored projects are understood to contribute to the research project and benet from
generated outcomes. To account for the participation of all investigators, we divided the
total monetary income from the research grants between the principal investigator (PI)
and her named co-investigator(s). Although we include co-investigators as beneciaries
of the grant, we positively discriminated PIs by assigning them half of the grant value
and splitting the remaining 50% amongst their co-investigators. PIs are assigned a major
part of the grant as they are expected to be responsible for the leadership of the research
and to prot most from a successful partnership. We additionally spread the grant value
over the whole award period, i.e., if the grant is 2 years we split it equally across those 2
years, if it is over 3 or more years, the rst and the last years (which are assumed to not
13Several papers have documented a trend towards increasing multi-co-authorship (see Katz and Martin,
1997), but, even after we control for the number of coauthors we still nd that the publication count has
at least tripled between 1985 and 2007.
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represent full calendar years) receive half shares and it is otherwise split equally across
the intermediate years.14 This is done in order to account for the ongoing benets and
implications of a project and to mitigate against the e¤ect of focusing all the funds at the
start of the project.
We use a 5-year window to calculate the stock of accumulated collaboration to better
capture the permanent prole of an academic. We constructed two time-variant dummy
variables, which allow for a di¤erential e¤ect for researchers who received funding that did
not involve industry collaboration, and for researchers who collaborated with industry
in the 5 years preceding the publication. Since our objective is to evaluate not only
the inuence of the existence of industry partners but also the intensity of collaboration
activity, we also compute the fraction of funds with one or more industry partners over
all EPSRC funds.
Figure 2 reports the percentage of industry collaboration and shows that the two groups
of universities do not seem to di¤er much. Table 2 reveals that these di¤erences, no matter
how small, are still signicant and on average the percentage of industry collaboration is
slightly higher (33% vs. 31%) for Russell Group universities. Figure 2 gives evidence of
a sudden increase in industry partnerships in the mid-1990s and a stagnation in recent
years, which a¤ected all UK universities equally. This might imply severe changes in
funding allocation through the UK research councils following the governments White
Papers from 1991 and 1993, which outlined changes in the structure of funding and higher
education (DES, 1991; DfE, 1993).
As mentioned above, we aim to separate the e¤ect of patenting from the e¤ect of
industry collaboration. To measure the impact of academic patenting on timing and rate
of publications, we use the number of patents led during the same year and the two years
preceding the publication. Researchers in Europe, unlike the US, cannot benet from a
grace period and hence they have to withhold any publication related to the patent until
the patent is led. Publications might be released once the patent is led. We therefore
expect a lag of up to 2 years between invention and publication in a journal. We can
14Formally, if Fundi;s;d;f is the monetary value of a grant f received by researcher i with start year s
and duration d, the value of the grant assigned to a year t is: (i) for d = 1; Fundi;s;d;f when t = s; (ii) for
d = 2;
Fundi;s;d;f
2
when t = s and t = s+ 1; and, (iii) for d > 2,
Fundi;s;d;f
2(d 1)
when t = s and t = s+ d  1
and
Fundi;s;d;f
d 1
when s < t < s+ d  1:
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see from Table 2 that the average number of patents di¤ers signicantly between the two
groups of universities (0.04 vs. 0.03). The values are very small for both groups but the
average number of patents led by researchers has increased substantially over the past
20 years and in particular after 1995 (from 0.03 in 1985 to 0.06 in 2003).
Control Variables. Research productivity and collaborative activity might be linked
to the researchers personal attributes such as sex, age, education and academic rank.
Some of these attributes, however, do not vary over time and therefore they do not play a
role in the dynamic variation, which is the focus of this paper. Academic rank is the only
time-variant observable characteristic in our dataset. Thus we incorporate information
on the evolution of researchers academic status from lecturer to senior lecturer, reader
and professor into our analysis. Lecturer and senior lecturer correspond to the assistant
professor in the US, whereas reader would be equivalent to associate professor. Year
dummies are included in all regressions to control for time e¤ects in our panel.
Interaction Variables. The e¤ect of industry collaboration on research output might
additionally di¤er for di¤erent types of academics. We therefore interact our measures of
industry collaboration with several categories of individuals in some of our models.
Firstly, since the descriptive statistics above show signicant di¤erences between the
two types of universities, we interact membership to the Russell Group with the measures
of industry collaboration. Most of the previous literature on the impact of industry col-
laboration (e.g. Agrawal and Henderson, 2002, Thursby and Thursby, 2007) only use data
on researchers at top universities (in terms of research or patents). However, the benets
and costs of collaborative projects di¤er depending on the institutional culture (Levin and
Stephan, 1991; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2001a) and might therefore lead to di¤erential
impact of industry collaboration on publication outputs. For the UK, Geuna (1997) nds
that universities with small science, engineering or medical departments publish fewer pa-
pers and receive less grants than other universities, but that a larger share of these grants
comes from industry.
Secondly, several papers have argued that the most able researchers, which in this
paper we label as stars, may di¤er considerably from the rest of academia in that they are
more able to combine academic and commercial research. Publication stars are not only
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found to collaborate more with industry, but they also produce more patents (Zucker and
Darby, 1996; Stephan et al. 2007). However, they also have plenty more opportunities to
conduct their research and do not need to adjust to specic societal needs (Goldfarb, 2008).
We hence expect the impact of industry collaboration to di¤er for these stars. As stars
we dene all those researchers that are on the top 25 percentile of research productivity,
with an average of 2 or more articles per year.
Thirdly, the impact of industry partnerships on the publication behaviour of senior
academics, who have more experience and an established network of research partners,
may di¤er from that of younger researchers, who pursue publications to further their
career (Dasgupta and David, 1994). The changes in university culture and the increasing
emphasise on collaboration, however, have been recent developments and it might be that
researchers at the start of their career best adjust to these new requirements. We therefore
create a binary variable that determines whether the researcher is at the start (lecturer or
senior lecturer) or at a later stage of her career (reader or professor).
2.2.3 Empirical Model
We base our empirical specication on the implicit assumption that the utility of an acad-
emic in a given year depends on her academic reputation and status, which are determined
by the stream of academic research output (past and present publications in peer-reviewed
journals), on the amount of research grants generated (research council funds) and, on com-
mercial output (number of patents). Publications, grants and patents are directly linked
to how much time or e¤ort the academic devotes to research, to collaborate with industry,
and to teaching and other activities. The time devoted to collaborate with the industry
may pose a trade-o¤ for academic research output, as it might provide new ideas but also
crowd out time for research.
The optimal time allocation problem for the academic consists in choosing the utility
maximising fraction of time she devotes to each activity. The rst order conditions involve
rst derivatives of the utility function with respect to the time devoted to research and to
collaborate with industry. Thus, for any utility function which is not linear in publications,
the rst order conditions dene an implicit function by which publications can be expressed
as a function of the relative time dedicated to collaborate with industry. This function will
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of course be conditional to time-variant and invariant socio-demographic characteristics
of the academic, and past publications.
To estimate how collaboration with the industry a¤ects research output, we estimate
a dynamic model where current publications are inuenced not only by past publications
but also by the degree of collaboration with industry. We choose a specication that
allows current publications to be a¤ected by the existence and the intensity of collaborative
funding. To do so, we include a dummy for having had any type of EPSRC past funding in
the last ve years, another dummy for having had EPSRC funding with industry partners,
and then a variable that measures which fraction of the overall funding was joint with
industry. By including a dummy (intercept) and a continuous variable (slope), we intend
to capture the trade-o¤ of industry collaboration on publications described above. 15
Accordingly, we formulate our reduced form equations as:
ln yit =
P
j=1;2 j ln yi;t j+1fundit+2ifundit+3 ln icit+
P
k=1;2;3 kpit 1 k+x
0
it+i+vit
where yit represents academic is research output at time t, fundit is an indicator variable
for having received EPSRC funds; ifundit is an indicator variable for having received
EPSRC funding with industry partners; icit measures the intensity of the collaboration
with industry; pit; are indicator variables for having led patents; and xit is a vector
time-variant explanatory variables including tenure rank. Since the distribution of grants
and academic research output has been found to be highly skewed (DEste and Fontana,
2007), we take logarithms of both measures. The error term contains two sources of
error: the academic is xed e¤ect term i, and a disturbance term vit. Thus, even if
the xed idiosyncratic disturbances i are uncorrelated across individuals, they create
autocorrelation of the errors over time.
To estimate the model above we need to use a method that corrects for xed e¤ects
induced autocorrelation, for the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable, and, very
importantly, for the endogeneity of industry collaboration, patents, and academic rank.16
For these methodological reasons, we chose to estimate the model using the GMM based
15A specication with an intercept and a linear term ts our data better because the researchers with no
collaborative grants at all are substantially di¤erent from those with a very small percentage of collaborative
grants.
16Publishing, getting many industrial funds, producing patens and being a professor, for example, may
all due to having a high cognitive ability, which is unobserved.
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Arellano-Bond estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991; Blundell and Bond 1998) and use
lagged endogenous variables and exogenous variables as instruments, which ensures the
consistency of the estimates. We treat as endogenous variables the lagged number of
publications, the number of patents, industry collaboration and academic rank. Year
dummies and department size are used as exogenous additional instruments.
The GMM estimator treats the model as a system of equations  one for each time
period  where predetermined and endogenous variables in rst di¤erences are instru-
mented with suitable lagged variables. To further improve the e¢ciency of our estimates,
we use the two-step GMM which takes deeper lags of the dependent variable as additional
instruments, as described in Roodman (2006). The two-step standard errors tend to be
downward biased and we therefore calculate Windmeijer corrected standard errors.
In order to illustrate the importance of correcting for reverse casuality of industry
collaboration and past realisations of research output when trying to estimate the true
impact the former on the latter, we also report GLS with xed e¤ects, and GMM estimates
treating industry collaboration and/or patents as exogenous variables.
2.3 Empirical Results
In this section we present our estimates on the impact of industry collaboration on re-
search productivity. We rst introduce our main results, comparing the estimates of our
benchmark model with those of alternative regression models. Then, we show how the
impact of research collaboration and patents on research productivity di¤ers across types
of researchers. Finally, we show how the results change if we use alternative measures of
research productivity.
2.3.1 Main Results
Table 3 reports the estimates of research productivity measured as the total number of
publications using four di¤erent model specications. While the rst model uses a GLS
with xed e¤ects estimator, specications 2, 3 and 4 are estimated using two-step di¤erence
GMM. In specication 2 industry collaboration and patents are treated as exogenous
explanatory variables. In the third column, industry collaboration terms are instrumented
as endogenous variables while patents are still considered exogenous. Finally, in the fourth
model, which we consider to be our benchmark, all the explanatory variables except for
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the year dummies are treated as endogenous. For all GMM specications, we report
the Arellano-Bond test and the Sargan/Hansen test at the bottom of the table. In the
following paragraphs we present the main results grouping them in themes for clarity.
Baseline and past publications: In all specications, the exponent of the estimate of
the constant term can be considered as the baseline productivity prediction, i.e. the
expected number of publications for a lecturer who does not have any previous funding
or previous patents. This baseline prediction for the number of publications ranges from
1.57 articles per year in the GLS specication to 1.36 in the benchmark GMM model
(1.57 and 1.36 are the antilogs of 0.453 and 0.308, respectively). Note that the baseline
number of publications decreases when we include the logarithm of the lagged number of
publications (GMM). We interpret this fact as an indication that the constant term in the
GLS specication was capturing the omitted lagged publications e¤ect.
The strong statistical signicance of the lagged publications in the GMM specications
in Table 3 shows that it is important to take into account the dynamic nature of the
publication process and thus use GMM as opposed to GLS. In all GMM specications,
the coe¢cients associated with the lagged publications are positive and, although the rst
lag is insignicant, the second lag is highly signicant throughout. Because we have taken
logarithms of both the dependent variable and its lagged terms, we can interpret these
coe¢cients as elasticities. Thus, according to benchmark specication results, increasing
by 100% (i.e. doubling) the number of publications of two years prior will increase the
expected number of current publications by 4.95%.
Having had funding in the last 5 years: As expected, the existence of any funding
in the past ve years enhances research productivity in all four specications. In the
GLS specication the had some funding coe¢cient is signicant and equals 0.0309,
indicating that if an academic had received funding she publishes, on average, around
3% more articles than if she did not receive any funding at all. If we take into account
the dynamic nature of the publishing process but not the fact that industry collaboration
and patents may be endogenous (second columns specication), funding does not have
any signicant impact on the number of publications. However, as soon as we take into
consideration that funding and collaboration are endogenous (columns three and four),
the coe¢cient becomes signicant again.
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Having collaborated with industry: More importantly, if some of this past funding
involves partners from industry, the average number of publications increases by a further
4% in the GLS regression. As a result, an academic collaborating with industry would
publish 7% more articles than one who does not receive any funding at all. As in the
previous case, in the benchmark specication, in which we take into consideration the
dynamics and the endogeneity problems (column four), the coe¢cient is larger.
Intensity of industry collaboration: The coe¢cient associated to this variable can be
interpreted as an elasticity. Although it is insignicant for the rst two specications,
this elasticity is signicant and negative in the last two specications. Thus, although
there is a discrete positive impact of collaborating with industry, the more an academic
collaborates with industry, the less she publishes.
To summarise, and drawing from the last, benchmark specication, a lecturer without
funding in the last ve years is predicted to publish 1.36 articles per year. If she had
obtained funding but did not collaborate she would be predicted to publish 14% more
publications or up to 1.57 publications. If part of the funding had been with industry
partners, she would see her publications increase by an additional 11%, up to 1.78. Thus,
having collaborated with industry would mean that she is expected to publish 25% more
than if she had not received any funding at all. However, as the level of collaboration with
industry increases, by say 10%, the predicted number of publications would decrease by
2.66%.
In Figure 3 we illustrate the impact of industry collaboration on publications with a
plot of the predicted number of publications for a lecturer with no patents for di¤erent
levels of intensity of industry collaboration. The levels of collaboration with industry
range from 0% to 100%, i.e., from no funding involving industry partners to all funding
involving industry partners. A lecturer collaborating with industry is expected to publish
1.78 publications in a given year, but the larger the intensity of her collaboration with
industry, the less she is expected to publish. At 33% of funds in collaboration with industry,
or the sample average, the predicted number of publications is still above 1.57, and thus
higher than if she would not collaborate with industry. At 38.5% of collaboration intensity,
the predicted number of publications matches exactly the number for non-collaborative
funding. Finally, if the percentage of her collaborative funding is 81.8%, the predicted
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number of publications is lower than if she had not received any grants in the past 5 years.
At even higher levels of collaboration intensity she is expected to publish less than 1.36
articles per year.
Patents: Consistent with the recent literature, ling a patent in the current year, and
in each of the two previous observation periods increases the number of publications in
the GLS specication (column one). The number of current patents and those in the year
before the last (t and t  2) increase the number of articles by about 2% each. However,
when we correct for the dynamic e¤ect of publications and use GMM, the signs turn neg-
ative. If we assume that past publications and rank are endogenous and collaboration and
patenting exogenous (column two), the coe¢cients associated to patents are all insignif-
icant. When we add industry collaboration to the set of endogenous variables, current
and past patents are signicant and have a negative e¤ect on publications (column three).
Finally, in our fourth -benchmark- specication which also takes into account the endo-
geneity of patents, all patent variables are insignicant. The release of patents hence has
no inuence on publications as soon as we correct for endogeneity.
Academic Rank: We also can observe di¤erences between the GLS and the GMM
specications with respect to the e¤ect of academic rank. In the GLS regression, later
career stages are associated with higher number of publications. All senior ranks (senior
lecturer, reader and professor) publish signicantly more than the omitted junior category
(lecturer). Moreover, being a Professor has a stronger e¤ect than being a Reader, which
in turn has a stronger e¤ect than being a Senior Lecturer. In the GMM regressions, on the
other hand, the e¤ect of being a Professor is lower than that of being a Senior Lecturer or
a Reader, although it is still signicantly positive. Readers seem to be those who publish
most, followed by Senior Lecturers, Professors and Lecturers respectively. Hence, after
allowing for endogeneity of research output, which is linked to tenure promotion, we nd
evidence for reduced productivity over the career life-cycle (Levin and Stephan, 1991).
Goodness of t: With respect to goodness of t of the GMM models, the Arellano-
Bond tests - reported at the bottom of Table 3 - do not reject the null that there is absence
of second (or higher) order correlation of the disturbance terms of our specications, which
is required for consistency of our estimates. The Sargan/Hansen tests are also insignicant
suggesting that the models do not su¤er from over-identication.
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2.3.2 Di¤erences across Academics
In Table 4 we present the estimates of model specications that interact researchers
characteristics with our variables of interest, that is industry collaboration and patents.
For simplicity, we present the main and interacted e¤ects estimates in two columns. The
rst column of each block (main e¤ect) corresponds to the researchers in the groups
described in the column header, the second column (interaction e¤ect) corresponds to the
estimates of the comparison group.
In the rst specication we separate out the e¤ects of academics that belong to the elite
group of universities (Russell Group) from the academics at other universities. Despite
of the dissimilarities in terms of descriptive statistics, the e¤ect of industry collaboration
on publications does not di¤er signicantly between the two groups of universities in our
sample. The estimates and the levels of signicance for the Russell Group academics
do not di¤er substantially from those in our benchmark model in column four of Table
3 except for the estimates associated to the number of led patents. For academics at a
Russell Group university the estimates for the patent variables turn negative and the e¤ect
of the number of patents led the previous year becomes signicant (-0.201, equivalent to
a reduction of 20% in publications). Although statistically not signicantly di¤erent, the
e¤ect of patents is more positive for academics at universities that are not members of the
Russell Group.
The second block of regressions presents the estimates for a di¤erential e¤ect of industry
collaboration and patents for the star researchers, academics in the top 25 percentile in
terms of average publication numbers, which in our sample is an average of 2 or more
publications per year. As in the previous regression, we observe that the estimates for stars
are similar to the average estimated in the benchmark model in Table 3. The estimates
for the academics not categorized as stars do not di¤er from the non-stars signicantly
either. Hence, both regressions suggest that the e¤ect of knowledge transfer on publication
productivity does not di¤er by the level of prestige, whether that of the academic or that
of the university.
Looking at the third block of results, we can see that the coe¢cients for senior sta¤
(Readers and Professors) are larger than in the benchmark model and that they di¤er
signicantly from the coe¢cients for junior academics (Lecturers and Senior Lecturers).
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Firstly, the impact of having received funding on the number of articles is more posi-
tive for senior academics (0.390, equivalent to an increase of 39% of the constant) as is
collaboration with industry (0.163 equivalent to a further 16%). Also, the e¤ect of the
intensity of a researchers involvement in collaborative research is more negative than that
of the benchmark (elasticity of -0.729). Junior sta¤ on the other hand benets less from
research funding, which indicates that less experienced members of sta¤ are less able to
transform funding into research output in terms of publications. Their number of publi-
cations, however, decreases far slower as the fraction of grants involving industry partners
increases.
2.3.3 Weighted Number of Publications
Table 5 contains the estimates of variations of the benchmark model as a robustness check
exercise. Instead of the natural count of publications, we model the number of publications
weighted by the number of coauthors and the quality of the publishing journal.
All the coe¢cients have the same sign as in the benchmark regression in Table 3. Their
magnitude however is smaller and some of the e¤ects of funding and collaboration become
insignicant. Receipt of funding, with and without the industry, does not signicantly
a¤ect the number of publications, if they are weighted by the number of coauthors. The
intensity of collaboration has still a signicant and negative e¤ect. Therefore, industry
collaboration has a more damaging e¤ect on coauthor weighted publication counts than
in the normal count of publications.
Instead, if publications are weighted by the impact factor, the intercepts associated
with receipt of funding and collaboration are positive and signicant. The coe¢cients are
very similar to those of the benchmark regression in Table 3. The estimate of the intensity
of collaboration, instead, is much smaller and insignicant. Therefore, collaboration with
industry increases is better in terms of quality of the publications.
Interestingly, when weighting publications by the number of coauthors, Professors no
longer publish more than Lecturers. Academics tend to publish with an increased number
of coauthors as they progress in the academic rank and although the count of publica-
tions is signicantly greater, the weighted average is not. Nevertheless, when adjusting
publications by quality, the e¤ect of the Professor dummy becomes again positive and
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signicant.
2.3.4 Basicness of Publications
We now disaggregate our results using the Patent board classication index. Table 6
reports the estimates for the impact of collaboration and patents on the count of publi-
cations in each of the four categories of research journals, applied technology, basic
technology, applied science and basic science. The rst category is considered the
most applied and the last one the most basic.
In all the regressions, except the fourth, the coe¢cients of collaboration display the
same sign as in the benchmark regression in Table 3. But the magnitudes of the coe¢cients
for the two dummies di¤er substantially across the regressions. The positive e¤ect of the
existence of funding is mainly due to an increase in the number of publications in the
basic technology category. The positive e¤ect of the existence of collaboration is mainly
due to an increase in the number of publication in the applied technology category. The
negative e¤ect of the intensity of collaboration, instead, is more widespread. It not only
reduces the number of publications in the most applied set, but also in the most basic set
of publications.
In sum, funding has a positive impact on technological research (applied technology and
basic technology). While funding without industrial partners biases output towards the
area of basic technology, funding with industrial partners introduces a bias in publications
towards the area of applied technology. Funding alone does not signicantly increase the
number of publications in applied technology unless it involves partners from industry.
The e¤ect of collaboration on this set of publications is indeed more positive than for the
aggregate set in the benchmark regression. The positive dummy coe¢cient is larger and
the negative e¤ect of the intensity is lower.
We do not nd the positive e¤ect of funding on publications in scientic research
journals. For both, applied scientic and basic scientic, the funding dummies do not
have a signicant e¤ect. The overall e¤ect of the two dummies on the most basic set of
publications is negative. But we observe signicant decreasing numbers of publications for
an increasing fraction of industry collaboration. A researcher hence publishes most in the
scientic research journals if she does not receive any research grants or research grants
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with no industry involvement.
The release of patents in the current year has a negative e¤ect on the number of
publications in basic technology journals. Patenting in the previous year also has a negative
e¤ect on publications in applied scientic journals. As these represent the elds of research
most closely related to the invention of new technology and hence patenting activity,
the negative signs could indeed conrm the secrecy hypothesis and a crowding out of
publications in favour of patents.
2.4 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper studies the e¤ects of research collaborations, a knowledge transmission channel
that does not necessarily involve commercialisation. As argued by many authors, research
collaborations, contract research, consultancy, and conferences are far more important
channels of knowledge transfer than patents, licenses and spin-o¤s. They are, however,
more di¢cult to measure empirically and even more di¢cult to compare across institutions
and time. Here, we have focused on the e¤ects of research collaborations using homoge-
neous information on grants awarded by the EPSRC, the by far most important funder of
research in engineering sciences in the UK. By comparing individuals who are involved in
industry collaboration mediated through these grants with researchers who do not receive
funding or do not partner with industry, we are able to identify the e¤ects of collaboration
on research productivity.
Our main results for this panel indicate that, on average, researchers benet from col-
laborating with industry. Researchers with no industry involvement are shown to publish
less than those with a small degree of collaboration. Nevertheless, higher levels of indus-
try involvement negatively a¤ect research productivity in terms of number of publications.
Still, the publication rate of an academic with an average level of collaboration is higher
than that of an academic with no collaborative funding. But for higher levels of collabo-
ration, the predicted number of publications turns out to be lower. There are, therefore,
two countervailing e¤ects: the presence of industry partners is associated with a higher
degree of academic research output but the intensity of industry collaboration decreases
academic productivity.
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We show that the impact of excessive diversion from academic activity through indus-
try collaboration can be seriously underestimated when an inadequate estimation method
is used. As documented in previous research (e.g. Arora et al. 1998, Agrawal and Hender-
son, 2002), past, present and future publications are correlated. Thus, including lags of
the dependent variable creates endogeneity and biases the estimates. Further, successful,
productive researchers are better placed to attract interest from industry. Industry col-
laboration and patents can be the consequence, and not just the cause, of high numbers
of publications. We therefore use a dynamic panel data estimation method in which the
lagged dependent variable and other endogenous variables are instrumented for.
Without controlling for the dynamic e¤ects, both the existence and the intensity of
industry collaboration would appear to enhance the number of publications. But as collab-
oration and past publications are correlated, the positive e¤ects of past publications would
be wrongly attributed to collaboration. When this dynamic e¤ect of the publications is
taken into account, the intensity of collaboration no longer enhances academic produc-
tivity. Still, if one assumes that collaboration is exogenous, its e¤ect is very small and
insignicant. This could be caused by a correlation between industry collaboration and
other unobserved time variant factors, such as accumulated ability or experience, which
also enhance academic productivity. Once we instrument the industry collaboration, the
negative e¤ect of the intensity grows stronger and becomes signicant.
To estimate the e¤ect of patents it is again crucial to take into account both the
dynamic e¤ect of publications and the endogeneity problem. In a standard xed e¤ects
regression, patents would have a positive and signicant impact on the number of publi-
cations. This result would be consistent with the more recent evidence on patents (e.g.
Fabrizio and DiMinin, 2008, and Azoulay et al., 2009). This positive e¤ect disappears
in the dynamic panel data models because the patents no longer capture parts of the
e¤ect of past publications. If one considers patents exogenous to publications, the num-
ber of patents even has a negative and signicant impact on the count of publications.
This signicance is not conrmed once we control for endogeneity. Indeed, it is possible
that patents are positively correlated to an unobserved factor, such as consultancy ac-
tivity, which is also negatively correlated with publications. Correcting for endogeneity,
the patents do not predict publication rates, as already found in Agrawal and Henderson
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(2002) and Goldfarb et al. (2009).
Our ndings suggest that encouraging universities to collaborate moderately with in-
dustry is a benecial policy. A small degree of industry collaboration not only facilitates
the transfer of basic knowledge and accelerates the exploitation of new inventions, but
also increases academic productivity. Collaboration, though, promotes applied research
and discourages basic research. Collaboration unambiguously increases the publications
in the most applied set of journals while it decreases those in the most basic set. There-
fore, collaboration might need to be discouraged if basic research output is the desired
objective.
We use a large uniquely created longitudinal dataset containing the academic career
of the majority of academic engineers in the UK. We concentrate on the Engineering
sector because it has traditionally been associated with applied research and industry
collaboration and it contributes substantially to industrial R&D (Cohen et al. 2002). In
other less applied elds, collaboration might generate fewer ideas for further research and
therefore the impact of industry collaboration might be worse. But, the time actually
spent collaborating with the industry might also be lower.
Ours can only be a rst step in the research of other channels of knowledge transfer.
We expect researchers with a high proportion of collaborative EPSRC grants to also have
a high proportion of contract research. But it is not clear whether our results would
change if the intensity of industry collaboration was measured as the proportion of con-
tract research with respect to total research funding. With more information on di¤erent
channels of knowledge transfer, we would be better able to make comparisons. Here we
have already shown that research collaborations have more impact on research produc-
tivity than patents. Further, it might also be interesting to tackle interactions between
di¤erent knowledge transfer channels. We know very little on whether collaboration chan-
nels complement or substitute each other. Consultancy, for example, might have a positive
e¤ect on research if it is complemented by collaboration in research. Of course, this is
only a conjecture and a challenging task for future research.
47
.
5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
Av
e
ra
ge
 N
u
m
be
r o
f P
ub
lic
a
tio
n
s
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
year
Non-Russel Group Russel Group lb/ub
Figure 1: Average number of publications per faculty member.
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Figure 2: Average percentage degree of industry collaboration based on EPSRC funds
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Mean collaboration
Collaborative funding
Non-collaborative funding
No funding
Table 1: List of universities
Russell Group Universities Number of ID Number of Observations
Birmingham, University of 204 2467
Bristol University 87 988
Cambridge, University of 200 2433
Cardi¤, University of 110 1310
Edinburgh, University of 99 1184
Glasgow, University of 109 1543
Imperial College London 294 3495
Kings College London 55 587
Leeds, University of 179 2060
Liverpool, University of 110 1401
Manchester, University of 242 1454
Newcastle, University of 155 1956
Nottingham, University of 176 2118
Oxford, University of 103 1271
Queens University, Belfast 107 1453
She¢eld, University of 185 2110
Southampton, University of 145 1734
University College London 137 1699
Warwick, University of 72 960
Other Universities
Aberdeen, University of 49 591
Aston University 64 897
Bangor University 32 328
Brunel University 87 988
City University, London 68 892
Dundee, University of 57 700
Durham, University of 49 528
Essex, University of 30 435
Exeter, University of 44 509
Hull, University of 41 533
Heriot Watt University 153 1838
Lancaster, University of 27 344
Leicester, University of 40 421
Loughborough, University of 247 3033
Queen Mary London 90 999
Reading, University of 51 656
Salford, University of 109 1362
Strathclyde, University of 201 2532
Swansea University 97 1299
UMIST (merged with Manchester in 2004) 224 2804
York, University of 31 356
Researchers can belong to more than one university during their career. Therefore the
numbers of id do not add up to 4066.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics.
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Table 3: Regressions of the number of publications on industry collaboration.
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Table 4: Regressions of the number of publications on industry collaboration with inter-
actions.
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Table 5: Regressions of the weighted number of publications on industry collaboration
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Table 6: Regressions of the number of publications for di¤erent classes of "basicness".
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CHAPTER III
THE IMPACT OF RESEARCH PRODUCTIVITY ON
GRANTSMANSHIP: CAN INDUSTRY
COLLABORATION CHANGE THE FACE OF SCIENCE?
3.1 Introduction
In the past three decades universities and other public research institutions have witnessed
a push for greater industrial involvement and relevance in research. In the UK for instance,
several policies in the 1990s directly sought to favour research relevant to technological
foresight and responsive to the needs of industry. The government initiated grants dedi-
cated to university-industry interactions. As a consequence contacts with agents outside
the university are encouraged and given a place in universities organisational structure by
being increasingly recognised in sta¤ promotion (Kitagawa, 2010). In addition, business
aspects of university research have been considered in the recent Research Assessment
Exercise (RAE) and will be used for the allocation of quality related block grants by the
funding councils (DIUS, 2008).
These developments have led to new opportunities for academic researchers, who are
given additional support and credit for working with industry. However, not all researchers
engage in collaboration activities equally. According to Owen-Smith and Powell (2001a),
knowledge transfer to industry requires a very di¤erent set of skills compared to traditional
academic research and only few academics may produce research that attracts industry
funding. Some studies have argued that rms considers academic quality when searching
for a research partner (Blumenthal et al., 1996b; Zucker et al., 1998) and that patents can
help to attract consulting and research contracts with industry by increasing an academics
visibility status and providing credibility to research projects (Audretsch et al. 2006,
Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2001a). There is, however, still
little empirical evidence on the real e¤ects of publications and patents on a researchers
propensity to engage in collaboration with industry.
Much of the existing empirical literature has focussed on the relationship between
patenting and publications and often considered patenting as a channel for collaboration.
This has been shown to be a misapprehension and that other channels of knowledge trans-
fer are far more important. Academics collaborate with industry through joint research
projects, consulting and sta¤ exchanges (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002; Arundel and Ge-
una, 2004; Cohen et al., 1998, 2002).
It has to be noted, that not all researchers engage in collaboration via the same in-
teraction channels and at the same rate (DEste and Patel, 2007; Link et al., 2007), and
that these channels may full di¤erent collaboration needs and hence appeal to di¤erent
academics (DEste and Perkmann, 2010; Perkmann and Walsh, 2009). Further, as argued
by Bercovitz and Feldman (2008) and Tartari et al. (2010), some researchers might feel
pressured to collaborate with industry and other external partners and engage in partner-
ships purely for symbolic reasons to conform to new requirements. These academics may
use di¤erent types of interactions compared to their peers that are committed to industry.
Publications and patents, in this context, could be considered as indicators of a researchers
scientic and commercial interest. They signal research priorities to a potential sponsor
and may anticipate the researchers disposition to engage in di¤erent types of funding
partnerships. Estimating the e¤ect of publications and patents on di¤erent channels of
collaborations may thus help to identify the collaboration preferences and opportunities
of di¤erent types of academics.
This paper considers the e¤ect of publications and patents on two types of industry
involvement on the individual level: (1) collaborative research projects nanced and led by
industry, and (2) collaborative research projects nanced by the research councils. Both
can be considered as indicative of the nature of research and the level of involvement of
the industrial partner and represent examples of two distinctly di¤erent approaches to
industry collaboration. Using data of a 12 year panel of 479 engineering academics in the
UK and employing GMM and 3SLS estimations to account for endogeneity, I nd that
the impact of publications and patents di¤ers for the two channels of collaboration, .
My results show that publication numbers have a positive impact on the receipt of re-
search council sponsored collaborative funding. Direct industry funding on the other hand
is not a¤ected by publication numbers. This contradicts existing survey evidence that nds
58
that publications are negatively correlated to industry grants (Blumenthal et al., 1996a),
but also other empirical studies nding a positive e¤ect of publication numbers on direct
funding from industry (Thursby and Thursby, 2010). The e¤ect of publications seems to
di¤er substantially with the channel of collaboration and more science oriented researchers
seem to engage in partnerships mediated by a public agent, perhaps for symbolic reasons
as suggested by Tartari et al. (2010).
I further nd a positive impact of patenting on direct funding from industry as previ-
ously suggested by Owen-Smith and Powell (2001a). I hence give evidence that commerce
oriented researchers are also more likely to engage in direct contracts with industry. This
conrms results by Thursby and Thursby (2010) for a panel of US researchers that does
not control for individual or time xed e¤ects, as well as ndings by Crespi et al. (2010)
that analyses a sample of UK researchers, however, without accounting for the e¤ect of
publications.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives details on the data
used and discusses the factors inuencing collaboration with industry. I further describe
the empirical strategy employed and introduce the di¤erent empirical methods. In section
3 I present the results, section 4 discusses and section 5 concludes.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
3.2.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
A longitudinal dataset of 479 academic engineers from 10 UK universities for the years
1996 to 2007 is utilised to investigate the impact of publications and patents on industry
collaboration. This data represents a sub-sample of a larger database collected at City
University as part of a project sponsored by the Economic and Social Research Council
(ESRC). The original database was reduced as data on funding partnerships for a su¢-
ciently long period was only provided by 10 institutions. They include 6 large engineering
departments with more than 100 academics (at 3 Russell group universities and 3 technical
institutions) and 4 smaller departments (at other UK universities) (see Table 7 for a list
of universities). The original data was collected based on sta¤ registers in academic calen-
dars and the name entries used as basis for gathering publications, patents and research
council funding information for the period 1985 to 2007 (for a detailed description see
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Banal-Estanol et al. (2010)). 10 departments in this original sample of 40 provided infor-
mation on funding received from industry, government and public bodies for the years 1996
to 2007. This information was matched with entries in the original database. The nal
dataset used in this analysis contains information on two channels of university-industry
involvement: (1) contract research through direct funds from industry and (2) joint re-
search sponsored by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC). I
only consider academics that remain in the sample for 10 years or more.
3.2.1.1 Variables
Below I describe the measures used in the analysis. Descriptive statistics for di¤erent
collaboration channels, funding and research output measures are presented in Table 8.
Collaboration Measures. Collaboration measure 1 is based on direct funds from in-
dustry which account for approximately 9.5% of all research grant income in the sam-
ple. This type of funding can be considered as indicative of application oriented research
aimed at solving specic problems of industry (Perkmann and Walsh, 2009; Thursby and
Thursby, 2010). 57% of researchers receive this type of funding at least once during the
sample period. The average amount of industry funding a researcher receives each year is
£21,352.
Collaboration measure 2 is based on grants from the Engineering and Physical Science
Research Council (EPSRC), a publicly-funded agency and the principal funding body for
engineering sciences in the UK. 83% of researchers in the sample are principle investi-
gators (PIs) on at least one EPSRC funded project during the 12 year period, which
reects the importance of the funding body for academic engineers. Again, 84% of these
researchers (70% of the total sample) receive EPSRC funds that involve partners from
industry at least once during the sample period. Though a non-governmental body, the
EPSRC has been required to promote knowledge transfer by, for example, increasing the
level of collaborative funding (DfE, 1993; RCUK, 2006). It has, since the 1990s, increas-
ingly sought to encourage partnerships between academia and other social actors (users of
research) including the health sector, industry, government, local authorities and not-for-
prot organisations and the service sector. Now, almost 45% of all funds involve partners
from outside academia. The average volume of collaborative EPSRC grants per academic
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per year is £77,876. These partnerships are typically led by the academic while industry
partners contribute with additional resources and hence may represent research targeted
towards less application oriented research (Perkmann and Walsh 2009). It could further
be indicative of collaboration sought for symbolic reasons (as described by Bercovitz and
Feldman (2008) and Tartari et al. (2010)) to conform to the requirements of the university
or the EPSRC.
For both measures I only consider projects for which the researcher is principal in-
vestigator and collect information on award date, grant period and funding amount. Co-
investigators could not be considered because not all 10 universities were able to supply
this information.
In addition I obtain data on other, non-collaborative grants, including grants awarded
by the EPSRC that do not involve industry partners, awards from other public bodies
(e.g. trusts, charities) and grants from applied government agencies and government
departments (e.g. MoD). While the rst represents more basic research, funding from
applied government agencies is mission oriented and might be comparable in nature to
funding from industry (Goldfarb, 2008).
The majority of researchers in the sample receive funding from more than one type
of funding agent during the observation period. 12% of researchers, however, receive no
funding at all. Of those that receive funding at least once, 78% work with industry through
at least one of the two collaboration channels. 45% engage in both forms of knowledge
transfer during the sample period.
Research Output Measures. I dene two di¤erent measures for research productiv-
ity: publications, representing academic output, and patents, as measure for commercial
output. Publications were obtained from the ISI Science Citation Index (SCI), which in-
cludes journals based on a selection and reviewing process and serves as a quality indicator
for publications of high scientic value.
Patents were collected from esp@cenet developed by the European Patent O¢ce (EPO).
The web interface allows searches for patents led with the EPO but also such led with
the UK Intellectual Property O¢ce (UKIPO) and other national patent o¢ces. Data
construction required a manual search in the inventors database to identify those entries
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that were truly the academic. This was done comparing address, title and technology class
for all patents potentially attributable to each researcher. As each invention can lead to
multiple patents I additionally veried each entry with the Derwent World Patents Index
(DWPI) that contains information grouped around a base patent, thus enabling me to
uniquely identify the original invention and avoid multiple counts.
In my sample 91% of researchers publish at least one paper, and 21% le at least one
patent during the observation period. The average number of publications per researcher
per year is 2.19, with the average number of patents being 0.08. Patenting activity hence
still presents a minor part of a researchers work even in applied disciplines like engineering.
The average number of publications and patents over a 3 year period is calculated to
account for a researchers recent research prole.
Individual, Departmental and University Measures. Literature has identied
other individual, departmental and university specic characteristics that may inuence
an academics research behaviour. Amongst individual characteristics academic rank is
the only time-variant factor and hence most important to my analysis. As a measure
for experience it has been found to correlate positively with individual productivity and
access to grants (Lee and Bozeman, 2005). However, having reached professorship there
might be less incentive to perform and hence a decrease in research activity also in view
of increasing administrative tasks (Levin and Stephan, 1991).
It has further been argued that individual characteristics can only partly explain re-
search behaviour due to its collective nature (Stephan, 1996) and several papers have
stressed the importance of the laboratory in research (Dasgupta and David, 1994; Stephan
and Levin, 1997). It is therefore of importance to account for network or laboratory size
when analysing access to funding. In this paper I use the amount of external funding
available to the department as well as the average amount of university income per acad-
emic as a measure for size and research activity at department and university level. This
information was collected from the 2001 and 2008 RAE submissions and from the Higher
Education Statistics Agency (HESA).
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3.2.1.2 Collaboration Channels and Research Productivity
Table 9 reports the mean statistics for research output and funding variables. The gures
give the average numbers per academic per year for the whole sample, (column 1), for
academics who have been involved in some kind of collaborative activity at least once dur-
ing their career (column 2), and separate for each channel of knowledge transfer (columns
3 to 5). Academics are assigned to one or more of the columns if they have used the
respective channel at least once during their career. 77.6% of the academics in our sample
have been involved in knowledge transfer activities at least once during the sample period.
They perform above average for all measures and not only attract more non-collaborative
funding, but outperform their colleagues also in terms of research output.
Comparing individuals across the two collaboration channels we nd some variance.
Researchers collaborating through both types of collaboration channels are also those re-
ceiving most other external funding. They further outperform their colleagues in publica-
tion and patent numbers (2.81 and 0.10). Those researchers that only collaborate through
direct interaction with industry perform below average in terms of publications (1.55) but
show average patent numbers of 0.09. Researchers only involved in EPSRC sponsored col-
laborations, on the other hand, receive almost their entire funding from research councils
and little funding from more applied sponsors like the UK government departments. They
perform above average in terms of publications (2.54), but have a lower number of patents
than researchers receiving direct funds from industry (0.07).
These rst descriptive statistics suggest that researchers that only receive income from
industry directly are those with the least number of publications. Academics in the other
two groups perform above average. This indicates that industry collaboration is generally
associated to high levels of academic research output, however, the amount received and
the collaboration mediator are important.
3.2.2 Econometric Considerations
The central aim of this study is to estimate how research productivity relates to industry
collaboration. Specically it analyses how academic productivity in terms of publications
and patents inuences collaboration with industry. The e¤ects are measured after con-
trolling for the e¤ect of past collaboration and access to other non-collaborative grants.
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Traditionally publications have been associated with academic benet and hence been
considered the foremost goal of research activity. However, increasingly academics are
judged also by their ability to raise money through research grants. Specically in engi-
neering, which is the focus of this study, research grants provide nancial aid to applied
research, which by denition requires expensive equipment. Unlike in other subject areas,
research money also is a key criterion for promotion and salary increases. For example,
the University of Strathclyde requires engineering sta¤ to give evidence for grantsman-
ship. Loughborough University specically expects external grants of £50,000 per annum
for promotions to Senior Lecturer level.
Publications and patents help attract external funding by attracting attention of ex-
ternal parties. Firms have been found to consider academic quality when searching for a
research partner (Blumenthal et al., 1996b; Zucker et al., 1998) and additionally patents
generate positive externalities by indicating real-world impact (Audretsch et al., 2006).
According to Owen-Smith and Powell (2001a) "many inventors reveal that they patent,
in part, because they feel it increases their academic visibility and status by rea¢rming
the novelty and usefulness of their work". They further report that patents can leverage
on industry, leading to grants and consulting contracts.
However, while successful grantsmenship is associated with high publication and patent
output, the direction of causality is two way. Just as research outputs may help to gain
funding, research money enables academics to more productive and hence produce more
publications and patents in return. It is therefore necessary to consider a dynamic model
that takes into account endogeneity of the research process.
I model receipt of a specic type of funding ((1)direct industry funding, (2) research
council funding involving partners from industry, (3) government ministry funding, and (4)
research council funding without partners from industry) as a function of the lag of funding
from this specic funding agent, lags of funding from other agents, past publications, past
patents, department income and seniority. Taking logs on both sides we take the following
equation to the data:
ln(Fundfit) =
P
4
f=1 1f ln(Fund
f
it 1) + 2 ln(MeanPubi;t 1) + 3 ln(MeanPati;t 1) +
1xit + 1wit + "it
with "it = i + it +  t and f = 1; 2; 3; 4, where f stands for the four di¤erent
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funding agents considered in this study, i is the cross-sectional unit and t is the time
period. . Fundfit is the measure of funds from funding source f received in period t.
MeanPubi;t 1and MeanPati;t 1indicate the average number of publications and patents
in the 3 years prior to receiving the grant. x represents other strictly exogenous covariates,
e.g. years and university wealth and departmental funds, and w other endogenous and
predetermined variables, e.g. seniority. The error term "it consists of a time-invariant
individual-specic e¤ect i, time dummies  t and a idiosyncratic disturbance term it. All
measures are log-transformed to normalise the highly skewed distribution.
Of specic interest to the analysis are parameters 2 and 3, which reect the e¤ect of
academic and commercial e¤ort on the propensity to gain funding. Both are endogenous
and determined by past funding. In order to control for endogeneity, I use as instruments
departmental and university characteristics that are likely to inuence the number of
patents and publications and lags of the regressors themselves but are unlikely to be
correlated with the unobserved factors inuencing the dependent variable in the equations
above . I describe those instruments in the next section.
3.2.3 Empirical Method
System GMM The model is estimated using system general method of moments (GMM)
estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) in order
to solve heteroscedasticity and endogeneity. The problem of heteroscedasticity arises as
scientic research is a¤ected by individual specic characteristics and systematic di¤er-
ences between individuals. Endogeneity occurs as the regressors are likely be correlated
to the unobservable determinants of the equations, the individual specic time-invariant
e¤ects, e.g. ability, talent, etc. We observe the latter when collaboration and publications
are both linked to experience or reputation and hence are correlated to the time-variant
error term. Moreover, we experience reverse causality, as any factor in the analysis can
be considered both an input and an output of scientic research (Bonaccorsi and Daraio,
2003). Researchers with publications and patents increase their visibility to attract grants,
but grants enable and enhance productivity of research and hence lead to publishable and
patentable outputs.
GMM provides methods to solve these problems by rst-di¤erencing the equations
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and using lags of the regressors as instruments. In the nal GMM-model funding history,
publication and patent outcomes and academic rank are considered endogenous and in-
strumented for. Lags of these regressors as well as di¤erences of the exogenous regressors
are used as instruments. Additionally, di¤erences of measures indicating the number of
patents and publications produced at the department level are used as additional instru-
ments.
In order to make the results more consistent and given the low number of T I use
System GMM, which adds additional moment conditions in levels and uses di¤erences of
endogenous regressors and levels of exogenous regressors as instruments. It further al-
lows adding time-invariant variables as instruments to the level equation. In this analysis,
university dummies, university group dummies, subject indicators and RAE quality in-
dicators are added (see Table 10 for an overview) The two-step estimator is utilized for
e¢ciency; standard errors are corrected using Windmeijer correction (Windmeijer, 2005).
3SLS. It is possible that unobserved characteristics inuence all the equations and that
di¤erent types of funding act as complements (Jensen et al., 2010). I therefore additionally
estimate the model as a system of simultaneous equations using three-stage least squares
(3SLS). 3SLS allows for the idiosyncratic terms (errors) to be correlated and further allows
the equations to contain endogenous variables. Additionally to the four structural equa-
tions estimated through GMM, I include three equations that estimate the endogenous
variables publications, patents and academic rank. As instruments, just as above, I use
the number of patents and publications produced by researchers in the department and
lags of the dependent variables. Though this method adds to the GMM I am unable to
su¢ciently control for individual heterogeneity and the endogeneity caused by the dynamic
feedback variable.
3.3 Results
I rstly aim to estimate the e¤ect of academic productivity on the amount of funding
received through two di¤erent channels of industry collaboration. Additionally I report
results for two non-collaborative forms of funding for comparison. The results of the
dynamic panel data estimations are presented in Table 11. Columns 1 and 2 report
estimates separately for each of the two collaboration channels, column 3 presents results
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for government department funding and column 4 for public and research council funding
that does not involve partners from industry. The results of the 3SLS estimation are
reported in Table 12.
We observe that direct funding from industry is indeed inuenced by existing involve-
ment with industry, indicating that an increase in funding in the previous period also
increases future funding. Collaboration variable 2 (column 2), also, is signicantly inu-
enced by existing EPSRC grants involving industry, though the e¤ect is smaller. Other
types of funding have no signicant e¤ect on the propensity to receive funding through
either channel. Similar e¤ects are found for non-collaborative funding in columns 3 and 4.
There is also an overall strong impact of funding received in the previous years, conrming
the general skewedness of funding distribution in academia.
The 3SLS estimates predict a stronger e¤ect of past funding acquisition. This is
perhaps caused by the inability of the model to control for individual heterogeneity and
endogeneity of the lagged variables. Not only can we observe a stronger e¤ect of past
funding from the same agent but also a moderate positive e¤ect of other types of funding,
suggesting some complementarities.
Table 11 also presents estimates for the impact of publication and patent numbers on
the amount of funding received. The results show that publications have a positive and
signicant impact on collaborative funding from the research councils. I have taken logs
of research funding and most of the regressors and the coe¢cients can therefore be read as
elasticities. A 100% increase in average publication numbers (e.g. from 2 to 4) in the last
3 years increases collaborative funding mediated by the research council by 83%. Direct
funding from industry, on the other hand, is not e¤ected by publications but is associated
with patenting outcomes. If a researcher were to double the number of patents this would
increase the amount of direct funding from industry by 160%. We observe similar e¤ects
in the 3SLS estimates in Table 12. The e¤ect of patents is slightly weaker, predicting an
increase of 144% in column 1. The e¤ect of publications on research council mediated
funding is slightly stronger with 0.892 (compared to 0.832 in the GMM).
Grants from research councils and other public agents that do not involve partners
from industry are also positively a¤ected by the number of publications. The e¤ect is
much stronger than for collaborative funds and increases public funding at a rate of 2.55.
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Funding from mission oriented government departments is not e¤ected by research outputs
but seems to be explained by other, unobserved factors. This is supported by the results
of the 3SLS estimation. They additionally show that the explanatory power of the model
is weakest for government ministry support (R2of 8.7% compared to 13.5% to 17.5% of
the other funding variables). The e¤ects for non-collaborative research council funding
in the 3SLS are rather surprising, however. The positive impact of publications is much
weaker than in the GMM specication but still stronger than the results for other types
of funding. Table 12 further reports a strong positive e¤ect of patenting for column 4.
Possibly the instruments that could be considered in the 3SLS specication were not
su¢cient in explaining patent numbers.
Academic rank does not seem to have any signicant inuence on the receipt of funding
for any of the funding variables specied in the GMM estimates. In the 3SLS I nd a
positive e¤ect of professor (and partly reader) rank for funding from industry and the
research councils. Government funding again is not e¤ected by any of the individual
characteristics.
Funding available to the department also has no signicant impact on the receipt of
external funding. The activities of other members of the department seem to play a minor
role in personal grant acquisition. There is a positive e¤ect of university wealth on funding
specically from industry and mission oriented government agents.
Finally, we should also note that the e¤ect of regional business expenditure on R&D
has a negative impact on direct funding from industry.
3.4 Discussion
This paper investigated the impact of research output measures on di¤erent collaborative
activities with industry. A unique database of 479 academic engineers was utilised to
investigate the e¤ect on two di¤erent channels of industry collaboration: (1) joint research
nanced by the industrial partners, and (2) joint research sponsored by a publicly-funded
agency. These results were compared to determinants of funding from two other agents:
(1) the mission oriented government departments, and (2) funding from publicly funded
agencies that do not involve partners from industry.
I nd that publication numbers have a positive impact on the receipt of research council
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sponsored collaborative funds while they do not have any signicant e¤ect on direct funds
from industry. Patent numbers, on the other hand, help increase direct industry funding.
These results indicate that indeed there are some important di¤erences between the two
channels of industry collaboration.
Collaborations sponsored through research council funding are subject to peer review
where publication numbers inform the decision of the funding agent. Industry partners
often take on a passive role (Perkmann and Walsh, 2009). This is not the case for direct
involvement with industry. Though Zucker et al. (1998) argues that rms consider acad-
emic quality, and rst ndings by Thursby and Thursby (2010) on US data nd a positive
correlation, this is not supported by my results. Changes in publication behaviour do not
a¤ect a researchers propensity to gain or accept industry funding.
The positive e¤ect of patents on direct funding from industry suggests that patents
could indeed help to leverage on industry as previously suggested in interviews conducted
by Owen-Smith and Powell (2001a). Following the interpretation of Thursby and Thursby
(2010) one could further conclude that researchers that signal commercial interest are also
more drawn towards application oriented research and direct industry funding. Whether
patenting researchers are more attractive to rms or whether they are simply more likely to
accept o¤ers made by rms, my ndings indicate a strong link between commercialisation
and industry involvement.
To take the discussion further, the positive e¤ect of publications on research council
sponsored collaboration might suggest that academics involved in scientic research and
producing a large number of publications are more likely to choose collaborations with
a passive industry partner. This could be supportive of hypotheses by Bercovitz and
Feldman (2008) and Tartari et al. (2010) that suggest that some researchers engage in
partnerships purely for symbolic reasons to conform to the requirements of the university
or of the funding agent itself.
Comparing the results for joint projects to other forms of external support, my analysis
reveals that the most able academics gain funding from research councils that does not
involve any kind of partners from industry. This again is supportive of symbolic part-
nerships assumed as a bargaining tool by researchers that are not considered the most
able.
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I also nd that funding from government ministries cannot be explained through aca-
demic research outputs. This partly conrms ndings by Goldfarb (2008) for researchers
repeatedly sponsored by NASA. Mission driven government funding goes to researchers,
who produce results of moderate academic value but which perhaps is of high value to
the sponsor. My estimates suggest that other factors may explain nancial contribution
of the government, e.g. existing links to specic research labs.
These additional observations show that academics least driven by traditional academic
values are those engaging in projects funded by industry directly but also such sponsored
by ministerial government departments. Applied funding agents like industry and gov-
ernment are not involved in partnerships with top researchers (at least not exclusively),
perhaps because publication stars are able to gain funding from public agencies (which
they can use to their liking) and do not need to fall back on alternative modes of funding.
Alternatively, while funding from the UK research councils is strongly correlated with
scientic productivity (whether it involves industry or not), direct collaboration with in-
dustry and other applied funding agents may require very di¤erent skills or circumstances
(Owen-Smith and Powell, 2001a).
However, there is also some evidence that the recent changes in funding allocation
through the research councils and the push towards more research serving societal needs
has had an impact on researchers grantsmenship. The positive e¤ect of publications is
less strong for research council funding involving industry than for such not involving
rm partners, suggesting that researchers producing work of medium quality are using the
applied partner to bargain research money from the councils.
Results from the department level and regional control variables show that univer-
sity wealth helps to predict the amount of individual funding and that regional business
R&D expenditure correlates negatively with funding from applied agents. The e¤ect of
university wealth indicates that initial non-competitive funding is very important to a
researchers funding acquisition process especially for attracting applied funding agents.
The negative e¤ect of regional business investment in R&D might hint at the importance
of universities in regions with small companies that only have small internal research
facilities.
I further give some evidence that even though researchers receive funding through
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more than one channel there is no strong evidence for substitution or complementary
e¤ects when funding is received. The result of the simultaneous regressions is indeed very
similar to the results of the separate models.
3.5 Conclusions
There are di¤erent scenarios that may explain my results and reect the intention of the
funding agent and the intention of the academic. I give two examples to give possible
explanations for the observed trends.
Firstly, funding allocation by the research councils is done through peer review and
hence based on the scientic publications of the researcher. It is therefore not surprising
that I nd a strong link between the two. Industry and government ministries may also
seek to work with the most able researchers, however, there is no exclusivity and their
decision is not based entirely on research outputs in terms of publications but perhaps on
technical reports, products and availability of technical equipment in the university.
Focussing on the intention of the academic, one could argue that academics nd re-
search council grants better suited to their needs as they help to support their core research
interests. Projects o¤ered by industry or government ministries may instead be application
oriented and not very attractive to the most able researchers. More commerce oriented
researchers may be attracted to application oriented research projects o¤ered by industry.
Secondly, due to the increased pressure to work with industry, researchers that are less
committed to knowledge transfer may engage in partnerships mediated by the research
council for symbolic reasons to conform to the requirements of either their university or the
research council itself. Researchers with a less convincing publication record may decide
to work with industry on research council sponsored projects to increase their chances of
nancial support. Similarly, science oriented researchers may engage in research council
sponsored collaborations as opposed to industry sponsored projects to conform to the
requirements of the university, again suggesting symbolic conformance.
In terms of policy implications I conclude that, if the policy maker seeks to support
the most able researchers then it is essential to o¤er continuous nancial support through
research council grants but also through initial non-competitive funds that are key for
building a basis for research competition. Many potential partners approach universities
71
to gain access to specialised equipment that could not exist without such non-competitive
grants. The push towards industry involvement is contra productive as it forces researchers
into symbolic partnerships.
If the policy maker seeks to establish new sources for research funding then the com-
mercial orientation of researchers should be encouraged further. A collaborative grant
o¤ered by the research councils might attract researchers for symbolic reasons and this
method of evaluation should be avoided.
Finally, this paper has shed a light on the determinants of industry collaboration as
they are gaining importance in the evaluation of academics. Judging from my results, to
account for industry collaboration in promotion decisions could indeed change the face of
science, as it is not the most able researchers but researchers producing results of little
scientic impact that receive industry support. The results hint that academics might
engage in purely symbolic partnerships that might counter their scientic e¤orts. Whether
academics change their research behaviour or nor, the results of this paper spark serious
concerns about the attempt to consider industry partnerships in promotion and funding
allocation.
This paper can only be a rst step in the analysis of industry collaboration. I was
able to consider two channels of collaboration, both of which were expected to support
research projects. The results may indeed be very di¤erent for collaborations that are
not aimed at fostering research. Academics involved in consulting or sta¤ exchanges may
exhibit very di¤erent publication and patenting proles. Further, some of the long-term
e¤ect may di¤er from the short-term e¤ects reported here, particularly in relation to
complementarities and substitution between di¤erent channels of collaboration. Future
research should therefore attempt to collect longer panels and to nd measures for other
types of collaborations.
This paper made a strong argument in describing publicly funded collaborations as
symbolic partnerships. In order to interpret the results more conclusively it would be nec-
essary to establish the role of external partners in collaborative research council sponsored
projects, a very challenging task for future research.
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Table 7: List of universities.
University Name No. of Academics in Sample
University of Cambridge 88
University of Durham 13
University of Glasgow 52
University of Lancaster 9
University of Leicester 22
Loughborough University 101
University of Reading 10
University of She¢eld 67
University of Strathclyde 81
University of Swansea 36
Total 479
Table 8: Descriptive statistics.
73
Table 9: Descriptive statistics and ANOVA for di¤erent types of collaboration.
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Table 10: Variables and instruments used in the regressions.
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Table 11: GMM regression. Impact of publications and patents on collaboration and
funding propensity.
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Table 12: 3SLS regression. Impact of publications and patents on collaboration and
funding propensity.
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CHAPTER IV
ACADEMIC PATENTING: OPPORTUNITY, SUPPORT
OR ATTITUDE?
4.1 Introduction
Universities have traditionally been an important source for knowledge creation and eco-
nomic growth. They support industrial innovation through solving fundamental research
problems (Aghion et al., 2008; Gibbons and Johnson, 1974; Nelson, 1986) and contribute
directly through licensing of inventions resulting from their research (e.g. Henderson et al.,
1998; Thursby and Kemp, 2002). Since the 1980s universities have become increasingly
proactive in their commercialisation e¤orts and the number of academic sta¤ involved
in patenting increased dramatically (e.g. Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Siegel et al., 2007;
Verspagen, 2006).
Numerous studies have investigated the determinants of academic patenting activity
and have found three factors that potentially a¤ect a researchers propensity to patent.
Firstly, many papers stress the importance of patenting support provided through the
commercialisation unit of the university and through nancial incentives (e.g. Foltz et
al., 2003; Lach and Schankerman, 2008; Thursby and Kemp, 2002; Thursby et al. 2009).
A second body of literature has focussed on the patenting opportunities of individual
researchers by measuring their scientic activity (e.g. Azoulay et al., 2007; Stephan et
al. 2007). Some recent papers have further highlighted that the inuence of peers on
researchers attitudes towards commercialisation (patenting attitude) is one of the main
factors for successful patenting (Bercovitz and Feldman, 2008; Stuart and Ding, 2006).
This paper aims to contribute to the latter stream of patenting literature by inves-
tigating the inuence of partners from industry on patenting. Interviews with engineers
conducted by Agrawal and Henderson (2002) suggest that interactions with industry can
steer academics towards commercialisation. This points to the possibility that indus-
try partners inuence a researchers attitude towards patenting. I additionally consider
in this analysis factors of patenting support e.g. support provided by the university as
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well as non-collaborative nancial stimuli, and factors indicating the scientic activity of
academics (patenting opportunities), e.g. publications and access to nancial resources.
The inclusion of funding in the analysis of a researchers patenting propensity, could
moreover challenge the existing evidence on the impact of publication numbers on patents,
due to the strong correlation between the two. In previous papers I have already shown
a strong link between funding and publications and moreover have found no signicant
e¤ect of patenting on publications (Banal-Estanol et al., 2010; Meissner, 2010). While a
large number of studies nd a positive impact of publication numbers on a researchers
propensity to patent (Azoulay et al., 2007; Breschi et al., 2005; Calderini et al., 2007;
Carayol, 2007; Stephan et al., 2007), in a study by Bercovitz and Feldman (2008), that
already controls for some public research funding and a series of peer group factors, this
e¤ect is observed to be very small.
This paper uses data from a 12 year panel of 479 engineering academics in the UK,
and nds that collaboration with industry is the best predictor of patent numbers. This
suggests that industry partners exert a positive e¤ect on a researchers approach towards
patenting. I further nd that researchers producing a large number of publications have
more possibilities to produce patentable research, however, not to the extent suggested
by other papers. I nd evidence to rene the e¤ect of publications, specically, that
high impact research is better equipped to produce novelties that can be turned into
patents. Additionally I give evidence that TTO support can help to open up a path
towards commercialisation for academics, but has no signicant impact on the number of
patents generated.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews existing literature and describes the
three di¤erent dimensions a¤ecting commercialisation of academic research: opportunity,
support and attitude, at the individual and institutional level. In section 3 I summarise
the data and introduce the empirical model and the methodology, considering the panel
structure of the data, the large number of zeroes and endogeneity present. Section 4
presents the results and section 5, nally, discusses and concludes.
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4.2 Patenting: Opportunity, Support and Attitude
Previous research has shown that university researchers di¤er signicantly in their com-
mercial activities (Louis et al., 1989). Researchers di¤er in their opportunities to patent
as well as in their attitudes towards the commercialisation of research. Moreover, do they
receive di¤erent levels of support for patenting. This section discusses the most important
individual and institutional factors a¤ecting an academics patenting propensity.
4.2.1 Individual Factors of Patenting
A rst important individual factor recognised by economic literature is scientic excel-
lence. It has repeatedly been argued that patents could potentially result from any ap-
plied research project that also generates publications. Agrawal and Henderson (2002),
for instance, cites an engineering faculty member at MIT, saying that "most patentable
research is also publishable" (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002, p. 58). Indeed both activ-
ities can be complementary as the e¤ort associated with and nature of research do not
di¤er (Dasgupta and David, 1994). Murray and Stern (2007), for example, nd that 50%
of a sample of articles in Nature Biotechnology are accompanied by a patent. Hence,
academics with the ability to successfully conduct scientic research also have the assets
to produce commercial outputs. Accordingly, research by Zucker et al. (1998) suggests
that researchers with an excellent publication record are also most likely to patent their
research (see also Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003; Louis et al., 2001; Zucker and Darby,
1996). Recent empirical work conrms the positive impact of publication numbers on the
propensity to patent (Bercovitz and Feldman, 2008; Carayol, 2007; Stephan et al., 2007;
Thursby and Thursby, 2007). Studies by Breschi et al. (2005) and Azoulay et al. (2007)
using duration models, for example, report a positive correlation between the number of
publications and patenting events. It therefore appears that only the most productive
researchers in terms of publications have the opportunities to engage in commercial ac-
tivities. However, Agrawal and Henderson (2002), while controlling for xed e¤ects, nds
no signicant correlation between the number of publications and patents for a sample of
engineers at MIT and Calderini et al. (2007) nds some evidence for a curve-linear rela-
tionship. While most patentable research is also publishable, not all publishable research
is patentable. However, publications are a rst good indicator for the research activity of
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an academic.
Additionally to publication numbers, the access to external research funding can be
considered an important factor for producing patentable research. Research funding, espe-
cially in applied engineering science, is essential to acquire laboratory equipment required
for research and allows the employment of research assistants. Accordingly, surveys by
Zucker et al. (1998), and Link et al. (2007) indeed nd that experience in managing grants
adds to more e¤ective patenting. Moreover, the access of funding may support patent-
ing directly through provision of expertise by the funding agent or specic appropriation
requirements.
However, not all researchers receiving external grants pursue commercialisation of their
research equally and there exists evidence for a very skewed patenting process (Agrawal
and Henderson, 2002; Azoulay et al., 2007; Thursby and Thursby, 2007). While scien-
tic experience and funding enable academics to produce and better recognise potentially
patentable research, the academic may simply not ascribe high value to commercial ac-
tivities. Traditionalists amongst academic researchers might indeed feel that commercial-
isation threatens academia and that the two should be distinct (Owen-Smith and Powell,
2001b).
Building on this conicting evidence, this paper investigates whether industry funding,
rather than publications or external grants as such, are responsible for pushing researchers
towards commercialisation. Collaboration with industry and other applied sponsors helps
overcome the barrier between scientic and commercial activities. Several studies have
shown that industry provides funds and ideas for research (Lee, 2000; Manseld, 1995;
Siegel et al., 2003), and may steer them towards commercialisation (Agrawal and Hender-
son, 2002; Gulbrandsen and Smeby, 2005). Exchanges with the business community and
joint research projects may hence help to overcome an intrinsic fear of changes in academia
and steer academics towards patenting.
The individual factors described in this section refer to the three di¤erent aspects that
enable patenting: opportunity, support and attitude. Figure 4 gives an overview over
the di¤erent dimensions. While scientic publications and access to funding indicate a
researchers opportunity to produce patentable outcome, funding moreover provides the
support necessary. Contacts with industry then may impact on a researchers attitude
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towards commercialisation.
4.2.2 Institutional Factors of Patenting
Though undoubtedly patenting is prompted primarily by an academics desire to solve
research questions (Levin and Stephan, 1991) it is also a¤ected by the opportunities of
the scientic eld, the nature of rewards associated with patenting and the support given
to the academic (David and Dasgupta, 1994).
The characteristics of the scientic eld and industrial relevance of research are impor-
tant factors in the opportunities for patenting research ndings. Firstly, not all areas of
research produce patentable outcomes, and other forms of commercial output and intel-
lectual property, such as software and architectural works, may be generated. Secondly,
the benets associated to patenting di¤er between elds (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2001a).
It has further been shown that the support provided through the university is essential
for successful patenting. Since the 1980s most universities in the US and across Eu-
rope have established commercialisation units (e.g. Technology Transfer O¢ces (TTOs))
to better identify commercial opportunities, provide expertise for e¢cient patenting and
to source potential licensees of university inventions. Characteristics of these commer-
cialisation units have indeed been found to positively inuence the number of invention
disclosures (e.g. Siegel et al., 2003; Thursby and Kemp, 2002). Moreover, the share of
licensing revenue positively e¤ects the number of inventions disclosed to the university
(e.g. Lach and Schankerman, 2008; Thursby et al., 2009). Thus, activities of the TTO
may increase the willingness of academic sta¤ to patent and license, encouraging strategic
choices in the dissemination of research (Geuna and Nesta, 2006; Thursby and Thursby,
2002).
Although these ndings suggest university policies and culture to have a strong impact
on commercialisation activities, Louis et al. (1989) in a survey of US life-science researchers
and Bercovitz and Feldman (2008) analysing the disclosure activity of researchers at two
medical schools, nd socialisation and peer e¤ects to be better predictors. Bercovitz and
Feldman, (2008) nds the patenting activity of researchers of similar rank in the same
department to positively a¤ect an academics attitude towards patenting. Several other
papers also report evidence that the proportion of inventors at the university level and in
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the department has a positive e¤ect on patenting (Breschi et al., 2005; Louis et al., 1989).
The institutional factors again reect the three di¤erent aspects that enable commer-
cialisation of research (Figure 4): opportunities provided by the scientic eld, support
provided by the TTO and attitude shaped by the activities of peers.
To summarize, literature has identied several factors inuencing academic patenting:
(1) indicating the opportunity for commercial research, (2) the support for successful
patenting, and (3) factors shaping a researchers attitude towards commercialisation.
4.3 Data and Methods
4.3.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Longitudinal data on academic, commercial and collaborative histories of 479 tenured
academics from 10 UK universities for the period 1996 to 2007 is used to analyse a re-
searchers propensity to patent (for a list of universities see Table 13). The data for this
analysis comes from a larger dataset collected at City University in 2008 that comprises
information on more than 4000 engineering academics from 40 universities over a 22 year
period (see Banal-Estanol et al., 2010). Initially, researchers were identied using sta¤
registers in academic calendars, which provided the basis for collecting individual infor-
mation from the Internet, and researchers publication and patent histories from existing
databases. 10 universities additionally provided information on external funding received
from industry, government and public bodies for the period 1996 to 2007. Only academics
that remained in the sample for the rst 10 years (1996 to 2005) were considered to allow
for a su¢ciently long observation period. Table 13 gives an overview over the average size
of the engineering schools at the 10 universities and shows the distribution of the sample
across universities. The sample includes approximately 50% of the engineering sta¤ at the
10 schools. For three of the small universities this share is much lower, indicating that
more academics stay for just a short period of time before perhaps moving on to more
established engineering departments.
In this section I give a detailed overview over the collected data. Descriptive statistics
for some key variables are presented in Table 14. Table 15 lists the variables used in the
regression.
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Patents. For each academic in the dataset, patents stating her as an inventor were
collected from esp@cenet, developed by the European Patent O¢ce (EPO). The web
interface allows searches for patents led with the EPO but also those led with the UK
Intellectual Property O¢ce (UKIPO) and other national patent o¢ces. I consider here all
patents that state the researcher as an inventor and hence not only patents led by the
university but also those assigned to third parties, including industry. Data construction
required a manual search in the inventors database to identify those entries where the
identity of the academic was certain. This was done by comparing addresses, titles and
technology classes for all patents potentially attributable to each researcher.1 As each
invention can lead to multiple patents, I additionally veried each entry with the Derwent
World Patents Index (DWPI) that contains information grouped around a base patent,
thus enabling me to uniquely identify the original invention and avoid multiple counts.
I collected all patents ever granted to each researcher and recorded the year of priority
which represents the date closest to invention. The oldest collected patent dates from
1964, indicating that patenting is not a new phenomenon in universities in the UK. In
total 196 inventors were granted 727 original patents. 149 patents were only issued at
national patent o¢ces (mostly UKIPO), 578 were registered at the EPO or WIPO (World
Intellectual Property O¢ce). 156 of the 196 academic inventors led patents during the
observation period 1996 to 2007. A third of the patenting researchers led only one patent
during their entire career to date. 40.6% of patents are assigned to a company and only
37.0% to universities. This conrms the importance of considering non-university patents
when analysing academic patenting in Europe (Geuna and Nesta, 2006).
The majority of researchers (67.43%) does not patent during the observation period.
Even among those academics who patent during the 12 year period, 69 (more than 44%)
do not le more than one patent. Hence, the average number of patents in our sample
is low with approximately 0.08 patents per academic per year (see Table 14) and a share
of zero observations of 93.88%. This shows that patenting is not widely spread amongst
university scientists even in applied engineering sciences.
141 academics with common names had to be removed from the data as it was not possible to uniquely
identify their patents.
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Funding and Collaboration. Funding information for each academic was provided by
the research o¢ces of the 10 universities. They included names of principal investigators,
funding periods, funding amounts and the natures of sponsoring agents. Researchers
receive external funding from ve di¤erent agents: (1) UK research councils, (2) industry,
(3) government ministries (excluding research councils), (4) EU, and (5) not-for prot
organisations. Academics receive half of their funding from the UK research councils,
amounting to an average of 19,821 GBP per academic per year (see Table 14). An average
of 8,626 GBP, 21% of funding, is received from industry sponsors. The other three funding
agents contribute less than 10% each.
To account for the length of a grant and to avoid focussing all the funding on the
start of a project, the grant value was divided by the length of the grant period and
equally distributed across years except for the rst and last year of a project, which were
assigned half-year values as they do not represent full years. More than 60% of external
funding extended over a period of one to three years, and a small number were long-term
grants. Less than 1.5% of grants extended over six years or more. I generate 3-year moving
averages of the di¤erent grant variables to account for the length of the research projects
and to allow for a long term e¤ect of external income on commercial research activity.
To account for patenting opportunities I create an indicator variable that takes the
value one if a researcher receives less than 2000 GBP annually over a 3 year period. Such
low amounts of funding are not targeted towards research but are perhaps providing travel
or conference assistance. Approximately 45% of observations take the value 1.
To estimate the impact of industry funding on patenting propensity I calculate the
share of funding from industry received over the previous 3 years. On average, 21% of
funding comes from industry with some researchers receiving funding exclusively from
private sponsors. The correlation coe¢cients in Table 16 show that industry funding
correlates stronger with patenting than with publications though both coe¢cients are
very small. Funding in general correlates stronger with publication numbers than with
patenting. This might indicate that indeed considering funding in the analysis of patenting
propensity may diminish the e¤ect of publications.
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Publications. Information on articles published during the observation period was ex-
tracted from the ISI Science Citation Index (SCI) for each academic in the sample. Entries
were matched using authors names, a¢liations and article titles. The SCI includes jour-
nals based on a selection and reviewing process and is hence biased towards work of
scientic importance. These journals represent the most important journals in their eld
and will serve as a measure for academic research output in this analysis. The average
number of publications is approximately two articles, though we can observe large hetero-
geneity in publication numbers with the maximum number in one year being 27 articles
for one academic (see Table 14). Additionally, to account for the quality of publications I
consider their average impact. I employ the ISI Journal Impact Factor (JIF), a measure
for the relative quality of a journal in which an article is published based on the number of
citations it received over a 3 year period. Though not a direct measure for the quality of
a paper, it reects its importance attributed by peer-review and presents a good indicator
for research impact. The average JIF for publications in my sample ranges from zero to
27.36, the mean value is 0.997 (see Table 14).
As patenting is expected to occur for very productive researchers that publish consis-
tently over a long period, this productivity is measured using moving 3-year averages of
publications. Alternatively, researchers that publish consistently in high impact journals
might have many more opportunities to patent. I therefore measure the impact as the
average JIF of a researchers publications during the past 3 years. Table 16 shows that
both measures are mildly correlated but that funding correlates stronger with publica-
tion numbers than with the average impact (though both coe¢cients are very small). I
therefore expect funding to diminish the e¤ect of publication numbers rather than that of
publication quality.
I create an indicator variable of publishing activity that takes the value one if an
academic publishes less than 1 article annually over a 3 year period, which represents just
below 40% of the sample. This indicator should help to identify those researchers that
have no opportunities for patenting.
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Institutional Factors. Academics were grouped into engineering departments accord-
ing to Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) categories. Five subject dummies were cre-
ated, Electrical and Electronic engineering (107 academics), General engineering (118 aca-
demics), Mechanical engineering (117 academics), Chemical engineering (64 academics)
and Civil engineering (73 academics). Table 17 shows the distribution of inventors and
patent observations across the 5 elds of engineering. These rst statistics show that
patenting is most widely spread in Electrical and Electronic Engineering as well as Chem-
ical Engineering. These two elds also show the largest average number of publications,
indicating a strong link between both types of research output. Civil engineers generate
the least number of patents and publications. They also show lower levels of funding and
industry involvement. Funding levels, however, are lowest for researchers in Chemical en-
gineering. There hence are signicant di¤erences in the research behaviour of researchers
in di¤erent elds of engineering. Funding, publications and patent levels seem to be linked
within each eld, the only exception being Chemical engineering that shows a large number
of publications and patents despite low levels of funding.
To control for di¤erences across these engineering departments in terms of size, research
activity, wealth and quality, I use data from the 2001 and 2008 RAE submissions. For each
department I gather information on external research income reported to the RAE and
calculate the share of income from industry contracts. I further use the number of PhD
degrees awarded and RAE quality ratings as measures for department research quality.
Additionally, based on information from the full sample of 5000 academics, I retrieve the
number of active members of sta¤ in the same department.
As proxies for peer e¤ect I use the number of academic inventors in the same depart-
ment and an indicator taking the value one if these included a senior member of sta¤,
based on information from the large dataset. Again, to account for the lag in e¤ects, I use
moving averages over 3 years as variables in my analysis.
Further, as mentioned above, studies have found TTO support to have a signicant
e¤ect on patenting activity in the university. I use the number of TTO sta¤ reported to
the Higher Education Business and Community Interaction (HE-BCI) survey in 2006 as
a proxy for support provided.
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Promotion. I also include a control to account for an academics recent promotion.
Academic rank information was collected from university calendars and indicates whether
the researcher has been promoted during the past 3 years. Promotion requirements of the
university may e¤ect the type of research done by the academic and a recent promotion
may hence allow an alternative research behaviour.
4.3.2 Model and Methodology
As discussed above, previous papers reported that patenting is inuenced by publication
numbers and external funding and that collaboration with industry may additionally steer
researchers towards commercialisation. Further, research eld, department and university
characteristics and peer activity may have an impact on a researchers patenting propen-
sity. It has further been shown that patenting is a highly skewed process and that therefore
it is important to consider dynamic feedback mechanisms and individual heterogeneity.
All factors are considered in the period t  1 to allow for a lag in the e¤ects.
The model I seek to estimate is described by the following equation:
Patit = 0+1PatStockit 1+2 ln(PubAvgit 1)+3 ln(IndFundit 1)+4Promit 1+
5PeerPatit 1 + 1rdt 1 + 2Fieldd + 3sd+ i + it +  t
Where Patit represents the number of patents led by academic i in year t. PatStockit 1
measures a researchers accumulated patenting stock up to t  1, PubAvgit 1 is the acad-
emics scientic capital (mean number of articles published during the 3 years prior to t);
and IndFundit 1 represents the researchers tangible industry income (share of industry
funding during the 3 years prior to t). Promit 1 is the time variant variable indicating
a researchers promotion during the previous 3 years. PeerPatit 1 are the variables indi-
cating the patenting activity of researchers in the same department (number of patenting
sta¤ and existence of a senior inventor in the last 3 years) and rdt 1 are other time variant
departmental variables including department size, department income and research activ-
ity of department d during the 3 years prior to t. Fieldd indicates the scientic eld and
sd then represents other department and university specic time invariant characteristics
including department quality and university xed e¤ects. i is the individual specic xed
e¤ect,  t is the time specic e¤ect and it the disturbance term.
The data used in this analysis is characterised by an excessive number of zeroes (more
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than 90% of observations). Some of these zeroes are expected to be "certain zeroes"
(those researchers assumed never to have opportunities for patenting), thus, the number
of zeroes may be inated and non-patenting cannot be explained in the same manner as
patent events.
Several methods have been employed to deal with large numbers of zeroes in economic
research and the most exible approach is known as the double-hurdle or two-step model
(Cragg, 1971). This model makes a distinction between e.g. un-patentable research and
not patenting patentable research. Cragg (1971, p. 831) described this process as follows:
"First a positive amount has to be desired. Second, favourable circumstances have to arise
for the positive desire to be carried out". Accordingly, zero patenting may mean either
non-participation in patentable research or non patenting due to factors such as patenting
support, individual attitudes or research opportunity. There are hence two hurdles or steps
in this model that a researcher must pass before patents are led: produce potentially
patentable research and actually patent.
In this study, the zero-inated negative binomial (ZINB) model is chosen to estimate
patenting. It represents a mixing specication which adds extra weight to the probability of
observing a zero. It can incorporate the framework of a double-hurdle or two-step model
by distinguishing between two di¤erent zero outcomes. It further allows for potential
overdispersion of patenting frequency, which is indicated by V ar(Patit) >> E[Patit],
and for unobservable heterogeneity (Carayol, 2007; Greene, 1994). Zero inated count
data models have commonly been used to model tra¢c accidents and health treatments,
and have increasingly become popular in the analysis of innovation, including academic
patenting (e.g. Carayol, 2007; Franzoni et al., 2009; Stephan et al., 2007). The approach
and the two hurdles are described in detail below.
Negative Binomial Distribution with Zero Ination. Patent production is as-
sumed to result from two di¤erent regimes underlying scientic research: (1) the engage-
ment in potentially patentable research, and (2) the decision on how many patents to
produce, illustrated in Figure 5.
The rst process relates to an academics research e¤ort and orientation. An academic
can decide to abstain from research and focus her e¤orts on teaching and administrative
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tasks. If she decides to conduct research she can devote di¤erent levels of e¤ort to research
activity, where active research can potentially lead to a patent. The probability that an
academics work does not lead to a patentable discovery (that a researcher belongs to the
"certain zero" group) can then be represented by the zero-ination parameter p. This
can be interpreted as a splitting mechanism that divides researchers into non-patenters,
with probability p, and potential patenters, with probability 1   p. p is determined by
covariates wit including measures for research activity (indicators for external funding and
publications in the 3 years prior to t), for opportunities of the scientic led (engineer-
ing sub-elds) and for promotion requirements (promotion indicator). The rst-hurdle
equation then is:
Pr(patentableit = 0jwit) = p = F (0wit)
where patentableit can be interpreted as a researchers involvement in patentable re-
search. If academic i is not conducting research, patentableit is zero, whereas, if academic
i is conducting research, patentableit is one. The function F (0wit) can then be modeled
as a Logit distribution (Greene, 1994):
F (0wit) = exp(0wit)=(1 + exp(0wit))
The second regime relates to the actual number of patents issued from patentable re-
search for researchers other than those in the "certain zero" group. This includes academics
that produce patentable research, but chose not to patent. Reasons for this choice can be
a lack of knowledge regarding the patenting process, an inability to recognise commercial
opportunities, a lack of administrative support, or individual attitudes that favour open
dissemination. These researchers could potentially be steered towards commercialisation,
e.g. by an industry sponsor, and are hence not "certain zeroes". As mentioned above, the
data is characterised by a large number of zeroes along with a long right tail (prolic in-
ventors). I assume that patenting follows a highly overdispersed Poisson distribution, with
small probability of success. To account for overdispersion and the unobserved heterogene-
ity among academics I assume a negative-binomial distribution, where the probability to
patent is determined by covariates xit, which includes all the individual and department
level variables of interest to this model. The second hurdle equation is then given by:
Pr(Patit = jjxit) = f(jjxit)
where f(j) is the negative binomial probability distribution for Patit.
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The two hurdle equations are jointly estimated by means of maximum likelihood. The
second hurdle equation is only maximized for observations with Pr(patentableit = 0) 6= 1.
The probability to patent is then equal to the probability of the unobserved variable Patit
conditional on patentableit:
Pr(Patit = jjxit; wit) = patentableit  Pat

it = F (0wit)  F (0wit)f(jjxit) + f(jjxit)
Thus,
Pr(Patit = 0jxit; wit) = Pr(patentableit = 0jwit) + Pr(patentableit = 1jwit; Pat

it =
0jxit) = p+ (1  p)f(0jxit)
Pr(Patit = jjxit) = Pr(Pat

it = jjxit) = (1  p)f(jjxit); j = 1; 2; :::
This represents the basic equations of the rst ZINB model that I will estimate.
As a second approach I consider an alternative denition of "certain zeroes". In this
alternative model, the two regimes are (1) the receipt of support for patenting, and (2)
making use of this support conditional on opportunities and attitude. Here the rst
process relates to the availability of e¤ective patenting support provided by the university
or external sponsors. Thus, patentableit is zero if academic i does not receive patenting
support, and one if academic i is receiving support.
The second regime again relates to the actual numbers of patents issued from research
that receives patenting support. The negative binomial regression then also includes acad-
emics that may not actively be involved in research or operate in areas that do not produce
patentable outcomes. The results of the negative binomial regression are expected to di¤er
signicantly from the rst model due to the alternative estimation of "certain zeroes".
Dynamic Feedback and Fixed E¤ect. It has been discussed above that patenting
activity is highly skewed and the majority of patents are produced by a small number
of researchers. This di¤erence is unlikely to be explained by observable individual het-
erogeneity. Instead unobserved di¤erences between individuals have to be an important
feature of this analysis as they are most likely correlated with the regressors, potentially
creating endogeneity. This endogeneity arises in two ways. Firstly, we are faced with the
problem of reverse causality as researchers who patent more may be better able to attract
funding from external sources (Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Meissner, 2010). Further, en-
dogeneity may arise through omitted variables as publications, patenting, promotion and
92
grant receipt are correlated to a researchers skills and e¤ort allocation (see Banal-Estanol
et al., 2010).
In order to control for unobserved heterogeneity and control for potential reverse
causality I follow Blundell et al. (1995) and estimate a model using the pre-sample values
of the dependent variable. I assume that unobserved heterogeneity in my data is mainly
caused by the di¤erent knowledge stocks with which individuals enter the sample, and that
patenting experience should contribute positively to a researchers propensity to patent.
The pre-sample value is given by the number of patents led by the academic before 1996
whether she was employed by a university or a company at the time.
Theory suggests that research activity and technological innovation are subject to
dynamic feedback and it is therefore important to also consider continuous, sample-period
dynamics when modeling patent counts (Blundell et al., 1995). To proxy for patenting
experience accumulated within the sample period I calculate the depreciated stock of
patents led during the observation period. I use Blundell et al.s (1995) assumption that
previous patents provide knowledge of the patenting process but that the quality of this
knowledge decreases over time. The sample period patenting stock is hence dened as:
PatStockit = Patit 1 + (1  )PatStockit 1;
with a depreciation value of  = 30% (following Blundell et al. (1995))
In order to conrm the specications of the model I carry out several tests. The
rst step is to test the endogeneity of publications and external funding using Hausmans
specication tests. The null-hypotheses of exogeneity is not rejected, suggesting that
there is no need for instrumental variable estimations. To test for the selection of the
ZINB model I rstly use the dispersion parameter alpha which is signicantly di¤erent
from zero, suggesting that the data is overdispersed and that a negative binomial (NB)
model is preferred over a Poisson model. The Vuong test is used to discriminate between
NB and ZINB models and suggests that the ZINB model represents an improvement over
a NB (Vuong, 1989).
4.4 Results
The results are introduced in Tables 18 and 19. Table 18 present the results using the rst
model specication for two di¤erent publication specications. Column 1 only considers
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the publication count variable and column 2 additionally includes the measure for average
publication quality. Both specications are included to investigate whether publication
quality replaces or adds to the e¤ect of publication quantity. Table 19 represent the
second model specication with an alternative denition of "certain zeroes". All models
include year and university dummies. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the
individual level. The results show that the xed e¤ect proxy, pre-sample patent control,
is signicant and works in the expected direction. Also the stock of patents is highly
signicant. The predicted number of patents increases by a factor of approximately 1.8
if an academic were to increase the patent stock by one while holding all other variables
in the model constant. These rst results indicate the dynamic nature of the patenting
process and hence the importance of considering dynamic e¤ects in this estimation.
4.4.1 Model 1: Patenting Opportunity as Source of Zero Observations.
Ination (First Regime) Model. In this rst model in Table 18 I am predicting
the "certain zeroes" with indicators for low levels of publications and funding during the
last 3 years, promotion during the past 3 years and the engineering departments, with
chemical engineering being the omitted category. The results show that researchers that
on average published less than 1 article and received less than £2000 funding over the
last three years are more likely to enter the "certain zero" group. The odds of being a
"certain zero" are increased by exp(31) = 2:91013 and exp(30) = 3:91012 respectively.
Hence, while academics generally are at little risk of entering the "certain zero" group (The
mean probability of being in the "certain zero" group is 0.180) this probability increases
dramatically for academics with low research activity. Also, researchers in the eld of
mechanical engineering are at greater odds of being a "certain zero" while researcher in
Electrical and Electronic Engineering and those in General Engineering are most likely to
produce patentable research. Promotion has no signicant e¤ect.
The ination model identies 472 observations (11% of the sample) as "certain ze-
roes". Some of the characteristics of these observations are displayed in Table 20. They
published less than one article in the past 3 years (mean 0.26), received little to no funding
(average of 59 GBP) and are mostly working in Mechanical or Civil Engineering. These
472 observations do not enter the negative binomial (second regime) model.
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Negative Binomial (Second Regime) Model. The negative binomial model predicts
the number of patents for the remaining 3649 observations. If all the predictor variables
in the model are evaluated at zero the expected number of patents would be zero. The
mean probability of a count of zero patents is 0.924.
The regression results show that the share of funding received from industry during
the last 3 years has a strong positive e¤ect on the predicted number of patents. Receipt
of other types of funding also has a positive e¤ect on patent rate, however, the e¤ect
is signicant at 10% only in the specication in column 2. As the model models the
log of expected patents and I have additionally taken logs of most of my explanatory
variables to normalise the distributions, the coe¢cients can be interpreted as elasticities.
For illustration let me consider the results reported in column one of Table 18, if the share
of industry sponsored research increases by e.g. 10% the predicted number of patents
would increase by 7.91%.
Additionally I consider the number of articles published in the last 3 years. I nd
no signicant e¤ect of publications on patenting in the negative binomial part of the
regression. Thus, researchers who have produced some patentable research in the previous
3 years, do not have an increased number of patents commensurate with an increase in the
number of publications. In column 2 I include the average impact score of publications
to the regression. The quality indicator has a positive e¤ect signicant at the 5% level
on the predicted number of patents. Doubling the average impact score would increase
the number of patents by 50%. Researchers with high quality publications thus patent
signicantly more than their peers with publications in journals of lower average quality.
Promotion has a positive albeit insignicant impact on a researchers patenting propen-
sity.
Two measures for the patenting activity of researchers in the same department were
included to measure the e¤ect of peers. Firstly, I considered the number of academic
inventors in the department. I include a quadratic term to account for a potential reverse
e¤ect for large number of inventors. Both e¤ects are signicant, however the Incidence
Rate Ratio (antilog) of the quadratic term is very large in magnitude and turns the
e¤ect negative almost instantly. If the number of academic inventors in the department
increases by 1, the academic herself will increase her patents at a rate of 0.20. However, if
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the number of inventors increases by 2 the predicted number of patents decreases at a rate
of -1.58. This might indicate some cyclical e¤ects of patenting activity in the department.
I therefore additionally include a dummy variable for senior (professor) inventors present
in the department. The e¤ect is very strong and positive. The expected number of patents
for an academic whose senior colleagues are involved in patenting is 2.66 (= exp(0:967))
times that of her peers.
Most other departmental factors have no signicant impact. Only the research orien-
tation of the department measured as the average number of PhD degrees awarded during
the last three years has a strong positive e¤ect on the expected number of patents. One
additional PhD degree awarded by the department increases the number of patents at a
rate of 1.03 (= exp(0:027)). However, the departments that ranked highest in the RAE
1996 and 2001 respectively seem to be less likely to patent than engineers at other de-
partments. The e¤ect is only signicant at the 10% level in the second specication. The
impact of external funding received by the department, the number of department sta¤
and the number of TTO sta¤ are insignicant.
4.4.2 Model 2: Patenting Support as Source of Zero Observations.
Ination (First Regime) Model. In the second model (Table 19) I am predicting
"certain zeroes" with indicators for nancial support at the individual and departmental
level, the size of the department and the number of sta¤ working in the commercialisation
unit of the university. The results of the ination logit suggest that researchers that receive
little funding and receive little TTO support are more likely to enter the "certain zero"
group. If a researcher was to half the amount of external funding, the odds of being a
"certain zero" would increase by 19%. Further if her university was to decrease the number
of TTO sta¤ by 1, the odds that she would enter the "certain zero" group would increase
by 0.75. The number of sta¤ and department wealth in general have no signicant impact
on the prediction rates.
The mean probability of being in the "certain zero" group is similar to the previous
model with 0.175. The ination model does not identify a "certain zero" in the sample with
a probability of 1 and hence all 4137 observations enter the negative binomial regression.
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Negative Binomial (Second Regime) Model. Similar to model 1, the expected
number of patents is zero if all predictor variables were evaluated at zero and the mean
probability of observing a zero is 0.934.
The regression conrms the positive e¤ect of industry funding on the expected patent-
ing rate and the e¤ect is slightly stronger than in the previous model. Funding from other
sources again is not found to have a signicant impact on the number of patents.
In this specication I additionally nd a positive e¤ect of publishing on the predicted
number of patents. This e¤ect is replaced by a strong positive e¤ect of the average
quality measure in the specication in column 1. If a researcher increased the number of
publications from say 1 to 2 this would increase the number of expected patents by 23%.
If instead she didnt publish more but increased the impact factor of the publication, the
number of patents would increase by 45%, making quality increase almost twice as e¢cient
as quantity increase.
Overall model 2 shows that for researchers, who receive patenting support through
funding and their university TTO, the propensity to patent increases with greater numbers
of publications as well as funding from industry. Promotion, again, has no signicant
impact.
The peer e¤ects are similar to the previous models though slightly weaker. The ex-
pected number of patents for an academic whose senior colleagues are involved in patenting
is 1.99 (compared to 2.66 earlier). Additionally just like in the previous model the average
number of PhD degrees in the department increases patenting at a rate of 1.03. The RAE
score is signicant at the 10% level and predicts that the number of patents at top ranking
departments is 0.579 times lower than at lower ranking departments. The number of TTO
sta¤ has no additional impact in the second part of the regression.
Department indicators were included in the model and show that researchers in civil
engineering patent less than their colleagues at other engineering departments.
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion
The results presented in this paper represent the rst robust evidence of the impact of
funding sourcing practices on the propensity and the intensity of patenting at universities.
I provide evidence that UK researchers receiving funding from industry are more likely to
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produce patents, controlling for a variety of individual and departmental characteristics.
I take into account the number of "excess zeroes" using a ZINB model, and control for
potential endogeneity in the patenting process and individual heterogeneity by including
pre-sample values of the dependent variable as regressors to the analysis.
I conclude that the research activity of an academic measured in quantitative terms
and the support provided by the department are not conclusive in explaining a researchers
propensity to patent. Indeed, as already argued by e.g. Bercovitz and Feldman (2008)
or Owen-Smith and Powell (2001a) the support of pro-commercialisation partners is key
in steering researchers towards patenting. I nd the e¤ect of an industry partner to be
strongest in explaining the number of patents.
This paper represents an attempt to nd di¤erent individual and department level
measures for patenting opportunity, support and attitude in order to estimate their com-
bined e¤ect on the propensity to patent. It discussed the problem of "excess zeroes" and
attempted to identify the factors responsible for their occurrence. It presented two models
that potentially help identify two groups as "certain zeroes". Firstly, academics that are
research inactive (that do not publish and do not receive research funding) or lack the
opportunity to patent due to working in academic elds that do not produce patentable
research; and secondly, researchers that do not receive patenting support (through TTOs,
funding etc.). Results for most of the regressors were robust across both specications.
However, I have shown that the choice of regressors for the ination regression is important
in the interpretation of the models, and that future research should consider carefully the
factors used in the rst hurdle in a ZINB model.
In the rst model I nd that researchers respond positively to funding, indicating the
importance of nancial inputs for the research process. Funding increases the probability
of producing patentable research perhaps by providing necessary equipment. This result
conrms evidence found by Zucker et al. (1998) in their survey. Publications also increase
the propensity to identify commercial opportunities and are an important indicator for
determining whether a researcher has assets to patent. However, there is no additional
signicant e¤ect of publications on patent numbers. This is in line with duration model
studies by Breschi et al. (2005) and Azoulay et al. (2007) that report a positive corre-
lation between the number of publications and a patenting event. The most productive
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researchers in terms of publications are more likely to become inventors, but they are
not predicted to le a large number of patents. Instead I nd that it is not productive
research, but high impact research that is more likely to produce patents. These ndings
qualify prior studies by conrming that the most productive researchers in terms of pub-
lications have many more opportunities to patent their research but that research quality
determines whether a patent is led.
In the main regression of the rst model I considered factors that might inuence
a researchers attitude towards patenting. I nd a positive e¤ect of the share of funding
received from industry on the number of patents. This conrms results from survey studies
(Gulbrandsen and Smeby, 2005) and anecdotal evidence (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002),
indicating a pull e¤ect of industry. Partners from industry perhaps have a strong interest
in pushing academics towards commercialisation to recover their research investments. I
secondly considered a peer e¤ect by measuring the impact of having a senior inventor
in the department and indeed nd a positive e¤ect. This conrms the evidence found
by Bercovitz and Feldman (2008) that reported a strong e¤ect of peer behaviour on a
researchers behaviour and attitude towards patenting.
The second model considers patenting support as the decisive factor in determining
"certain zeroes". The probability to enter the patenting regime is determined by the
magnitude of nancial resources available to the researcher as well as the support provided
by the universitys commercialisation unit. Both factors increase the odds of entering the
patenting regime. This indicates that TTO support can help to open up a path towards
commercialisation for academics. TTO support, however, has no signicant impact on the
number of patents in the main regression.
The e¤ect of attitudinal factors in the second model is equally as strong as in the
rst specications indicating a consistent steering e¤ect of industry funds and peers. The
positive e¤ect of publication quality is also conrmed in the second model.
In terms of policy implications I conclude that (1) patentable research benets substan-
tially from external funding, hence monetary incentives stimulate research for industrial
application, (2) internal support provided through a commercialisation unit, e.g. TTO,
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is critical for recognising patenting opportunities, (3) patentable research arises from pro-
ductive academics, indicating that some academic research is needed to generate com-
mercial opportunities, however, (4) only high impact research produces novelties that can
be turned into patents. Moreover, (5) university-industry collaboration is most e¤ective
for transforming knowledge into commercial opportunities. Finally, the opportunities to
engage in patentable research may di¤er between scientic elds even within engineering
sciences, policy makers should hence be careful in their expectations of patents.
This paper has added some important evidence to the discussion on university-industry
collaboration, but further data and a longer panel is required to draw more robust con-
clusions. Additionally, it is necessary to collect information for more departments and
universities to capture those academics moving between universities. Such academics had
to be discounted in this analysis but may represent a very di¤erent research and patenting
prole.
Due to the small sample size, I was further not able to distinguish between patents
owned by university and such owned by company partners. This distinction may help
to better understand the e¤ects of industry funding and of commercialisation support
provided by the university.
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Table 13: List of universities.
102
Table 14: Descriptive statistics.
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Table 15: Denitions of variables used in the regressions.
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Table 16: Correlation matrix for individual measures.
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Table 17: Descriptive statistics by department (scientic eld).
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Table 18: ZINB regressions with pre-sample observations and robust standard errors
(Opportunity Ination Model).
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Table 19: ZINB regressions with pre-sample observations and robust standard errors
(Support Ination Model).
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Table 20: Characteristics of the certain zero group (Opportunity Ination Model).
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APPENDIX A
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UK
The UK provides a good background for analysis of university-industry collaboration and
its e¤ect on the individual researcher due to its unique characteristics. It is a clear example
of a market oriented university system which developed via two di¤erent approaches to
government funding. Initially funding was reduced to promote research activities that at-
tract funding from non-governmental sources, and later was increasingly allocated through
mission oriented grants to indirectly control universities research agendas (Geuna, 1999).
The selective funding policies introduced in the UK represent a model by which the changes
in other European countries may be emulated. An understanding of the UK system may
therefore provide insight to better direct the evolution of other systems in Europe (Geuna,
1997).
UK government policies aimed at directing academic research developed in the mid
1970s when the Science Research Council (SRC; a predecessor to the Engineering and
Physical Science Research Council (EPSRC)) decided to support research of economic or
industrial relevance (Senker, 1998)1. During the 1980s, policies to promote the societal
impact of university research became more widely spread. The government reduced block
funding to universities and replaced it with selective grants, hoping that restrictions in
public funding would encourage links with industry (Geuna, 1997). At the same time,
several government programmes were set up to support collaborative research2, however,
with little success (Senker, 1998).
Since the 1990s a series of policy papers and advisory reports urged the government to
reform the public research system and encourage industry collaboration (Dearing, 1997;
Lambert, 2003; Sainsbury, 2007). These reports raised awareness of the importance of
knowledge exchange initiatives amongst university managers and established them as a
1 It was also responsible for the Teaching Company Scheme, set up to connect businesses with the science
base.
2E.g. the LINK Programme launched to bridge the gap between the research base and industry
(Senker, 1998: 29)
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third goal of universities. In addition, government backed its campaigns with nancial
resources, providing incentives to universities to move in its policy direction (Tapper,
2007). For instance, the Funding Council introduced several programmes to enhance the
contribution of science to the economy3. These programmes encouraged universities to
set-up technology transfer o¢ces to connect to businesses and to exploit their research,
partly because of the way these funds are allocated (a formula that is partly driven by
income from contract research and commercial activity). It became apparent that a link
between government funding and the pursuit of its desired policy goals has developed
(Tapper, 2007: 157).
Since the 1980s the share of government funding distributed on a competitive basis
has increased from 19% to 43% in 2003 (Geuna, 2009). However, the allocation of these
funds is highly skewed. The majority of Research and Funding Council grants are con-
centrated in just a few institutions. In 2006/07 the upper decile received £51,660K, with
£2,467K for median universities and nothing for the lower decile. The distribution of
income from commercial contracts is equally skewed. The majority of industry funding
goes to high prestige institutions, with most of the grants concentrating in specic sci-
ence and engineering departments (HEFCE, 2009; Senker, 1998). A median universities
receives £3100K, universities in the upper decile receive £15219K and those in the lower
decile again nothing (UUK 2008). Universities in the UK are by now faced with erce
competition for funding from government and industry, with a large number facing severe
nancial problems.
3E.g. Higher Education Reach Out to Business and Community in 1999 and replaced by the Higher
Education Innovation Fund in 2001, allocating funds of around £20 million per year on a competitive basis.
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APPENDIX B
DESCRIPTION OF THE DATABASE
The basis for this thesis is a longitudinal dataset containing detailed information on en-
gineering academics that were employed at the Engineering departments of 40 major UK
universities between 1985 and 2007. The data was collected at City University, London
as part of the ESRC project Benets and cost of knowledge and technology transfer:
A panel data analysis in 2008/09 and is partly available to other researchers through
the Economic and Social Data Service (ESDS). The dataset is the rst comprehensive
longitudinal data available on academic researches that includes the whole population of
academics employed at the studied engineering departments over the observation period,
not only successful academic inventors. The dataset comprises information on academics
publication, patents and external funding sourcing activity.
The project concentrates on the engineering sector, as it has traditionally been associ-
ated with applied research and operates between the two spheres of fundamental science
and application of technology, transforming knowledge from ideas to operational con-
cepts (Foray and Lissoni, 2010). Further, engineering is the discipline most relevant to
industry that contributes substantially to industrial R&D (Cohen et al. 2002). Indeed,
US universities rst established engineering as a discipline, to serve the needs of the local
community and local industries (Rosenberg and Nelson, 1994).
Also, industry collaboration amongst academics in engineering departments in the UK
is better recorded than in other disciplines. It has to be noted, however, that engineering
di¤ers substantially from other elds within the sciences, especially in its highly fragmented
and applied character. Any interpretation of results in this thesis has to consider this
before appropriating them to other elds of science.
B.1 Construction of the database
University List As a rst step in the data gathering process we collected the names
of universities with engineering departments from the 2001 Research Assessment Exercise
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(RAE). The RAE is a survey of research excellence conducted by the UK Funding Councils
every 5 to 7 years to rank university departments and form a basis for funding allocation.
This rst search revealed 80 universities with active engineering departments in the UK.
As a second step we tried to locate university calendars and prospectuses that display
faculty sta¤ information for each of the 80 universities for the period 1985 to 20071.
Calendars containing sta¤ information were available for 40 universities. These include all
19 universities with engineering departments that are part of the prestigious Russell Group,
a coalition of large, research intensive UK universities and an additional 21 universities
including both, comprehensive universities and technological universities. Unfortunately,
due to lack of su¢cient data, we were not able to include any of the so called "new",
post-1992 universities into our sample.
Academics names and rank The calendars provided complete lists of the universities
academic sta¤ with names and academic ranks of university researchers. Data collection
focussed solely on academic sta¤ carrying out both teaching and research and did not
consider research o¢cers or teaching assistants. Where possible we recorded full names,
but at least last names with two initials. Through careful cross-analysis we identied
those researchers that held positions in more than one of the engineering departments
in our dataset during their career. This information was matched and we were able to
trace researcher careers across universities. In total information on 7707 individuals was
collected. It should be noted, that academics leave (and join) our dataset at di¤erent
stages in their career, when they move to (or from) abroad, industry, departments other
than engineering (e.g. chemistry, physics, computer science), or universities not part of
our dataset. A small number of researchers also re-enters the dataset after some years of
absence.
Publication data Data on publications was derived from the ISI Science Citation Index
(SCI). Using surnames, rst initial and university a¢liation we collected all the articles
published by the researchers in our database while they were employed at one of the 40
1University calendars and prospectuses are available through the British Library, which by Act of Par-
liament is entitled a free copy of every item published in the United Kingdom. This data was supplemented
with information from the Internet Archive. The Internet Archive is a not-for-prot organisation main-
taining a free Internet library, committed to o¤ering access to digital collections. Their collection dates
back to 1996 and enabled us to retrieve information from outdated Internet sites.
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institutions. Most entries in the SCI include detailed address data that allow us to iden-
tify institutional a¢liations and unequivocally assign articles to individual researchers2.
We moreover carefully checked article titles and research topics to avoid mismatches for
popular names. The resulting publication database contains information on the number of
co-authors and journal ISSNs for each of the publications. Journal ISSN information was
matched with the ISI Journal Citation Reports to assign the Journal Impact Factor (JIF)
to each publication. The JIF is a measure of importance attributed to a journal based on
the number of citations the journals received in the three years following its publication
and is an indicator for the quality of a journal in which an article appears3. We further
obtained the Patent board (formerly CHI) classication (version 2005) of the basicness of
journals, developed by Narin et al. (1976) and updated by Kimberley Hamilton for the
National Science Foundation (NSF). The measure is based on cross-citation matrices be-
tween journals, it characterises the general research orientation of journals, distinguishing
between (1) applied technology, (2) engineering and technological science, (3) applied and
targeted basic research, and (4) basic scientic research. The classication only contained
SCI journals published in 2005; hence not all journals in our database could be assigned
a value of appliedness.
Collaborative research grants The majority of research projects considered in this
analysis were based on grants given by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research
Council (EPSRC), the main UK government agency for funding research in engineer-
ing and the physical sciences, and its predecessor the Science and Engineering Research
Council (SERC). Data on these grants is available from 1986 onwards. Driven by recent
policy developments the EPSRC encourages commercial and collaborative research and
as a result since 1995 around 40% of grants have involved partners from the industry.
The EPSRC provided us with a database containing information on the start year and
duration of grants, total amount of funding, names of principle and co-investigators, in-
stitution of the principle investigators (grant receiving institution) and names of partner
organisations. The names of both principal and co-investigators were matched with names
2Articles without address data had to be ignored. However, we expect this missing information to be
random and not to a¤ect the data systematically.
3Reports for all the years starting from 1985 were available from the British Library. We were hence
able to consider all SCI journals and to allow for variation in JIF
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in our database. The partner organisations were coded according to their characteristics
in terms of partners from industry and partners from public bodies or government. All
the partner names were searched on the internet and their websites screened to identify
them as businesses. Research grants that involved at least one partner from industry were
then identied as collaborative research projects.
Additionally to the EPSRC data we approached the 40 universities in our dataset
to provide us with external grant information. 22 universities responded to our call.
Seven submissions were incomplete, either missing researchers names, year information
or excluded funds from industry. Of the remaining 15 universities only 10 submitted
grant information for more than 10 years. Further, the majority of submissions only
included information on principal investigators. We therefore were only able to match
external grants at 10 out of 40 universities for a 12 year period (1996-2007) for principal
investigators. The data provided by the universities was already coded according to nature
of the funding body and allowed us to identify grants from an industry sponsor.
Patent data Patent data was obtained from the European Patent O¢ce (EPO) data-
base. The matching process was very lengthy and required intensive manual cleaning of
the data. This was necessary to collect all a researchers patents including those led with
universities or led with misspelled names. As a rst step, researcher surnames and rst
initials were used to extract patents from the EPO database. A broad matching exercise
based on surnames, rst names and initials (2nd and 3rd initials) eliminated researchers
with very di¤erent names. A ltering exercise then excluded patents based on age, address
information, and subject area. The age-lter excluded patents led before the researcher
started university education. This lter could not be used for all academics in the sample
but only those for who age information was available from personal websites. The address-
lter eliminated patents by inventors living too far from the academics work place. This
lter was used with great caution as academics are often a¢liated with several institutions
and may live far from their university. Instead, the address-lter mainly served to link
patents identied based on other criteria with others of the same address. The subject
lter represented the most important lter in our analysis. Based on discipline matching
and manual matching of patent descriptions with publication titles, patents truly by one
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of the researchers in the dataset could be identied.
The EPO database is problematic as many inventions have multiple entries. It was
therefore necessary to compare priority numbers to ensure that each invention is only
included once in our data. We additionally employed the Derwent World Patent Index
(DWPI) that contains information grouped around a base patent (the original invention).
The DWPI further allowed us to acquire cleaned and formatted data on patent assignees
and family size4. For each patent we collected the year of ling 5, the names of patent
assignee and the number of associated patents (family size).
The EPO does not cover patents that are only led with national patent o¢ces, e.g.
the UK Intellectual Property O¢ce (UKIPO). For a subsample of 479 researchers at the
10 universities that provided su¢cient external grant information and that remained in
the sample for the full period 1996 to 2005, we also collected information for patents led
with patent o¢ces other than EPO and those led before the observation period to build
an inventors prole. The patents were collected from the online search engine of the EPO
and matched according to the criteria described above. As a result of this additional data
collection in 2010, patents led up to 2007 could be included for this subsample.
Demographic Information For the same subsample of 479 researchers, we tried to
identify year and topic of their PhD. This information was collected from theses.com
which lists theses submitted at universities in the UK and Ireland and gives the date
of the PhD and the name of the degree awarding institution. Theses.com only contains
surname and initials and we carefully matched the names in our database with those on
the website. Again, we considered age and subject-lters to identify our researchers. The
age-lter excluded PhD theses submitted before 1950 or before the researchers turned 24.
The subject-lter compared names of dissertations with those of articles she published
during early stages of her career to identify the correct entries. In total we were only able
to identify theses for 407 researchers.
4While the EPO database is freely accessible and basic information on CD was provided to us free
of charge from EPO, access to the DWPI is very costly and could therefore only be used at the British
Library at a second stage of our data collection process.
5The ling date was chosen as it represents the closest date to invention. As the ling process can take
several years, we were only able to include patents awarded until 2007, hence led before 2005
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B.2 Problems of the Data
While the data collected for this thesis is the most comprehensive data on academics col-
laboration and research activity available, comprising information on publications, patents,
industry grants and collaborative research council grants, it is important to point out some
of its main problems:
1. The unbalanced nature of the dataset with unknown entry and exit motivation.
2. The di¤erent sources for external funding information with little evidence for com-
prehensiveness and comparability.
3. A limited time-period with no pre-sample or initial period information.
4. Type II errors (false negatives) in data matching.
As mentioned above, researchers enter, exit and re-enter the dataset at several occa-
sions. However, we have no information on their motivation, and no full record of their
academic activity to infer these motivations. This has to be seen as the greatest limitation
of our data. Future analysis should attempt to understand the reasons for entry and exit
by identifying new entries to the profession and retiring academics based on PhD year or
age information and to infer motives for other researchers from the analysis of academics
moving between the departments contained in our dataset.
The second problem refers to the fact that our external funding information relies on
data provided by the research o¢ces of the universities. We believe that the data was
submitted to the best knowledge of local research o¢ces; however, we cannot be certain
about its comprehensiveness. More importantly, grant information may be collected dif-
ferently at the di¤erent institutions. However, it can be reasonably assumed that the data
provided to us is similar in nature to data provided by universities to the RAE, following
standardised patterns of collection and compilation.
The third concern regards the limited time-scale of the data. The science production
process is a dynamic process where current performance is strongly inuenced by past
performance and the researchers knowledge stock. We have, however, little information on
the researchers stock of knowledge which limits our ability to separate learning e¤ects from
ability. For a subsample of scientists we added pre-sample period information on patenting
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to our data. Similarly it might be desirable to collect similar data on publications in the
pre-sample period and for a larger number of academics. Grant information, unfortunately,
is not available beyond what we were able to collect. We hope that the size of our panel
is su¢cient to infer learning e¤ects in academia.
The last limitation of our data refers to the problem of name matching in data col-
lection. Misspellings and missing information is apparent in all databases used to build
the dataset. We have mitigated this problem to a large extent by performing extensive
manual checks. There is, of course, the possibility that we were not able to identify all
the research outcomes associated with a researcher. Especially in cases of uncertainty
we opted for excluding data rather than falsely including it in our dataset. With these
caveats, the data, as presented here, is comprehensive to the best of our knowledge.
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